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VOLUME 53 FALL 1988 NUMBER 4
AIDS LEGISLATION IN MISSOURI:




Recently the Missouri legislature passed and the Governor signed emer-
gency legislation dealing with AIDS issues.' The major features of this legisla-
tion can be grouped into six categories: 1) HIV testing2 and the reporting,
* B.A., Northwestern University; LL.B., Columbia University; M. Phil., Univer-
sity of Cambridge, Trinity Hall. Professor of Law, St. Louis University School of Law.
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Matt Webb and Alex Miller for their
research assistance. I am also indebted to Dennis Hoffert for his assistance with our
legislative proposal.
** B.A., University of Missouri-Columbia, 1987, third year student, University of
Missouri-Columbia School of Law, Candidate, Missouri Law Review.
I. Act approved June 1, 1988, 1988 Mo. Legis. Serv. 285 (Vernon) (S. COMM.
SUBST. H. CoMm. SUBST. H.B. Nos. 1151 & 1044) [hereinafter H.B. Nos. 1151 &
10441. AIDS stands for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. AIDS is the end
stage of HIV disease which attacks the immune system leaving the body unable to
defend itself against various infections, cancers and other life-threatening conditions.
HIV stands for Human Immunodeficiency Virus which is generally accepted as the
cause, perhaps with co-factors, of AIDS. See Center for Disease Control, Update: Ac-
quired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in the San Francisco Cohort Study, 1978-1985,
34 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 573 (1985); Altman, Does AIDS Virus
Work Alone?, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1987, at Cl, col. 2. In this Article, "HIV" will be
used interchangeably with "AIDS virus."
2. "HIV testing" is defined in H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 1(5) as "performing a sero-
logical test or tests upon a sample of venous blood to determine the presence of HIV or
its antibodies following HIV blood sampling." "HIV blood sampling" is defined in
§ 1(4) as "taking or ordering the taking of a sample of venous blood from an individ-
ual which is subjected to serological tests for the presence of HIV or its antibodies."
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confidentiality and disclosure of test results; 2) Discrimination against persons
infected or believed infected with the AIDS virus; 3) Education; 4) Criminal-
izing certain conduct which creates a grave and unjustifiable risk of transmit-
ting the AIDS virus to another; 5) Regulating insurers in some regards and
exempting them from regulation in others; and 6) Declaring certain locations
used for activities which might spread the virus to be nuisances. The purpose
of this Article is to analyze this legislation.
I. TESTING
A. Regulation of those authorized to perform HIV tests.
Prior to the passage of this statute, HIV testing was not regulated in Mis-
souri. As a result, various organizations offered "AIDS testing" without any
supervision or quality control by the Missouri Department of Health or an
other agency or organization. 3 From henceforth, all testing, except that done
solely for the purpose of determining one's eligibility for insurance coverage,"
must be performed by physicians, hospitals or persons authorized by the De-
partment of Health. To obtain authorization, a person or organization must
provide suitable verification to the Department that the testing will be per-
formed in accordance with departmental regulations governing the types of
3. Prior to the AIDS statute, the state did not attempt to regulate AIDS testing.
However, all states receiving money from the Centers for Disease Control ("CDC")
were required to give two ELISAs and a back-up Western Blot test before declaring
the testee to be HIV positive. Furthermore, public labs were required to adhere to
additional quality controls to insure they were matching national standards. This condi-
tion applied to most states, including most large cities and CDC's 63 project areas.
Private labs, however, were not. Telephone interview with Tim Quinn, CDC, AIDS
Division (Oct. 14, 1988).
4. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 8.1. "No other section of this act shall apply to any
insurer, health services corporation, or health maintenance organization licensed by the
division of insurance which conducts HIV testing only for the purposes of assessing a
person's fitness for insurance coverage offered by such insurer, health services corpora-
tion, or health maintenance corporation ... ." Section 8.4 does require that HIV test-
ing done for insurability purposes be done in a laboratory:
certified by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services under the
Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act of 1967, permitting testing of speci-
mens obtained in interstate commerce, and which subjects itself to ongoing
proficiency testing by the College of American Pathologists, the American
Association of Bio Analysts, or an equivalent program approved by the Cen-
ters for Disease Control ....
Id. This, however, does not require that any particular test or series of tests be per-
formed. Of the tests currently available, the least expensive by far is the ELISA. This
is the test used to screen donated blood. It is highly sensitive, i.e., very few samples that
are in fact positive for HIV antibodies would escape detection. However, it is much less
specific, i.e., it produces a relatively high number of false positives. See infra note 6. A
positive test result would likely result in a denial of life or health insurance coverage.
Consequently, use of the ELISA test for insurability purposes would result in denial of
insurance to a substantial number of people not infected with HIV.
[Vol. 53
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tests performed and the manner in which they are performed. Licensed hospi-
tals are, however, deemed to be in compliance. The Act also mandates contin-
ued compliance monitoring.5 This is significant because the quality of the test
results is heavily dependent on which tests are performed and how they are
performed.6 Whether the regulation required here will ensure high quality test
results will have to await actual implementation and the test of time. The
President's Commission on HIV Epidemic recommends that a model state lab-
oratory licensing law be developed and adopted by the states.7
In addition, all HIV blood sampling,8 again with the exception of that
performed solely for insurance purposes,9 must be accompanied by consulta-
tion with the person to be tested prior to being tested and during the reporting
of the test results to him.'0 The term "consultation" is not defined in the stat-
ute. This omission is unfortunate. Thorough counseling is extremely important
in view of the serious psychological and public health ramifications of HIV
testing, even if the test results are accurate."' Perhaps the Department of
Health will issue regulations or guidelines for these consultations. The
5. Presumably, Department regulations would be such as to minimize inaccura-
cies in the test results. See infra note 6.
6. Meyer & Pauker, Screening for HIV- Can We Afford the False Positive Rate,
NEW ENG. J. MED., July 23, 1987, at 238; see also Okie, Study Faults Labs Accuracy
In Testing for AIDS Infection, Washington Post, Oct. 27, 1987, at 25 ("Laboratories
testing blood for evidence of AIDS have such a high error rate that in some low-risk
groups, nine out of ten positive findings would probably be wrong, a new government
analysis [by the Office of Technology Assessment] has found.").
7. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMU-
NODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC, recommendation 6-33, at 80 (June 1988) [hereinafter
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION].
8. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 1(4) provides that HIV blood sampling is the "taking or
ordering the taking of a sample of venous blood from an individual which is subjected
to serological tests for the presence of HIV or its antibodies."
9. See supra note 4.
10. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 2.3.
11. Schultz, AIDS: Public Health and the Criminal Law, 7 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REV. 65, 113 (1988) [hereinafter Schultz]. A positive test result can be devastating to
the recipient. Persons who test positive must be presumed to be infectious. See Krim,
AIDS, The Challenge to Science and Medicine, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 2, 5 (Supp.
Aug 1985). Infectiousness greatly affects potential parenthood and the safety with
which one may engage in sexual and other activities. See Schultz, supra, at 81 n.86
and accompanying text. In addition, a substantial percentage of HIV infected persons,
perhaps 50% or more, will develop full-blown AIDS, from which no one is known to
have recovered. See id. at 68 nn.16-18 and accompanying text. Persons being tested
should also be advised of the possibility of inaccurate test results and how to deal with
that possibility. See supra note 6. Those tested should also be prepared for the fact that
persons who are, or are believed to be, HIV infected may be discriminated against in
educational opportunities, employment, housing and a variety of other ways. For a dis-
cussion of antidiscrimination provisions, see infra text accompanying notes 97-111.
Even a negative result is not without serious potential consequences. There are frequent
reports of persons being denied insurance even though they tested negative because the
insurer apparently felt that the individual would not have been tested if there were not
some danger of being infected or becoming infected.
1988]
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counseling that testees are given should be a major element in the fight against
this disease. Virtually all authorities agree that education and counseling are
two very important weapons we have.12
B. Reporting of HIV test results.
Section 2.3. of the AIDS bill requires, with two exceptions, that all physi-
cians, hospitals or other persons who perform or conduct HIV blood sampling
shall report to the Department of Health the identity of any individual con-
firmed to be infected with HIV.13 One exception excludes testing for insurance
purposes and the other provides for anonymous testing.
Section 8, the first exception, concerns insurers, health services corpora-
tions and health maintenance organizations which perform HIV testing solely
for the purpose of determining insurability. These groups are to report con-
firmed positive results to the Department of Health only if the person tested
has not designated a physician to whom the results are to be reported. The
effect of this provision is that some physicians will be presented with test re-
sults whether they want them or not. Having received these results, the physi-
cians are presumably expected to report them to the Department of Health as
well as to the testee, in conjunction with the consultation requirements men-
tioned earlier. However, the statute itself requires only that the physician re-
port to the Department of Health if the doctor performed or authorized the
HIV blood sampling. This would not ordinarily be the case where a person is
tested by an insurance company which then forwards the results to the physi-
cian."" Department of Health regulations require reporting HIV infection
without specifying which physicisn must make such reports." It is not clear
how these regulations will mesh with the new AIDS statute. Read literally, the
regulations would require physicians, as well as insurers and their agents, to
report communicable diseases to the Department of Health. The AIDS statute
exempts insurers only from the requirements of the statute itself.
12. Cf. 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY
SYNDROME 28, 33; INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CON-
FRONTING AIDS: DIRECTIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH, HEALTH CARE AND RESEARCH 20,
125 (1986) [hereinafter CONFRONTING AIDS]; McGuirl & Gee, AIDS: An Overview
of the British, Australian, and American Responses, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 107, 129-32
(1985).
13. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 3.4 provides for another exception: "The identity of
any individual participating in a research project approved by an institutional review
board shall not be reported to the department of health by the physician conducting the
research project." The reason for this exclusion is to encourage participation in re-
search projects.
14. See H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 2.3.
15. According to Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 19, § 20-20.020 (1986), "a physician at-
tending any person who is suffering from AIDS" must report to the Department of
Health. Id. § 20-20.020(5) (emphasis added). However, it is unclear whether a physi-
cian notified by an insurance company would be considered the attending physician.
But see Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 50-101.020(2) (1983).
[Vol. 53
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The fact that insurers are relieved of any duty to inform persons of HIV
test results may have the benefit of shifting that task to a person or agency
better trained to do so. However, it could also shift liability to the designated
physician or the Department of Health for untoward consequences resulting
when the individual is notified. In Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of
California,' the California Supreme Court found the defendant therapists lia-
ble to the plaintiffs for the wrongful death of their daughter who had been
killed by her ex-boyfriend. The ex-boyfriend had been under psychiatric care
of a defendant's psychiatrist.1 7 During the course of his treatment the patient
had confided to the psychiatrist his plan to kill the deceased, a plan he carried
out. 8 The court found that the psychiatrist had breached his duty to warn the
victim.' 9
Other courts have expanded the principle of this case to include a poten-
tial victim class.' 0 No case has yet gone so far as to hold an insurance com-
pany liable for failure to notify identifiable potential victims of persons in-
fected with the AIDS virus, but the analogy is clear. If an insurance company
has no duty to even report test results to an insurance applicant, there is, per-
haps, little basis to hold the insurer liable for injury to a third person. The
designated doctor to whom the insurer is required to report a positive HIV test
result may have a duty under a current Department of Health regulation re-
quiring "attending physicians" to notify household members of a patient's con-
tagious disease and how to avoid contracting it." Although a "designated phy-
sician" is not, ipso facto, an "attending physician," there appears to be no
public health reason to make a distinction.
It is also unclear how broadly "household members" will be interpreted.
Would it, for example, include a homosexual live-in lover, or a heterosexual
lover not living on the premises? In any event, while it is important to protect
the public, it is not clear that placing this burden on the physician is the wisest
policy. Doing so may lead physicians to refuse to treat persons infected with
HIV. Perhaps the regulation should be revised to make notification of third
parties by the physician optional and to clarify that if the physician reports the
patients' HIV status to the department of health the physician could not then
be held liable on a Tarasoff theory."
The second exception to the reporting requirements is contained in
16. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
17. Id. at 21, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
18. Id.
19. The court found that a therapist owes a legal duty not only to his patient, but
also to his patient's would-be victim. Id. at 25-26, 551 P.2d at 345-46, 131 Cal. Rptr.
at 439.
20. See Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 193 (D.C. Neb.
1980); Hedlund v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. 3d 695, 705, 669 P.2d 41, 46, 194 Cal.
Rptr. 805, 810 (1983).
21. MO. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 50-101.050(4) (1984).
22. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 128-29 (especially recom-
mendation 9-40 which supports this approach).
1988]
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Section 13. of the Act. That section requires that the Department of Health
designate one HIV testing site in each the St. Louis, the Kansas City, and the
Springfield areas where persons who are not required by law to undergo HIV
testing may be tested anonymously. The rationale for this exception is to en-
courage the testing of those who would not otherwise be tested for fear that
the fact of testing or the results of testing might be used against them by the
government, or fall into private hands and result in various types of discrimi-
nation. Some who claimed that name reporting is necessary for public health
reasons vehemently opposed this provision. They asserted that the statutory
provisions requiring that test results be kept confidential and prohibiting dis-
crimination against infected persons would satisfy any concern about the mis-
use of test results. The confidentiality and anti-discrimination provisions are
discussed later. The public health arguments are discussed in the notes.23
23. As this author understands the position of those who are opposed to anony-
mous testing, it can be summarized as follows:
1) The Department of Health needs the names of persons testing positive for HIV
so that these persons can be contacted when necessary. Such contact might be neces-
sary if a person tests positive but neglects or refuses to learn the results of the test. If
the Department possesses identifying information it could attempt to contact that indi-
vidual to deliver the results, to counsel that individual on the implications of the results
and to solicit the person's cooperation in so-called contact tracing, the process of notify-
ing persons whose contact with the infected person may mean that they, too, are in-
fected with HIV.
Those in favor of anonymous testing have responded by arguing, among other
things, that although it may be true that anonymous testing would prevent locating
these individuals, the argument depends on the assumption that these infected persons
have voluntarily come in, identified themselves accurately and been tested. That as-
sumption, it is argued, is critically defective because many of those most likely to be
infected will not voluntarily be tested if that requires that they identify themselves.
This is so, it is said, because many of those most at risk of being infected have spent a
substantial portion of their lives hiding their status as IV drug users, gays or bisexuals
and are not going to jeopardize their anonymity by putting their name on a government
list because loss of anonymity would almost certainly carry with it a number of disas-
trous consequences including social disgrace, family embarrassment, loss of job andjob-related health and life insurance, even criminal prosecution. They cite first-hand
experience in counseling such persons as well as evidence that penalizing homosexual
conduct results in poorer reporting and treating of sexually transmitted diseases. Os-
trow & Aitman, Sexually Transmitted Diseases and Homosexuality, 10 SEXUALLY
TRANSMITrED DISEASES 208, 212 (1983); see also Schultz, supra note 11, at 79 and
sources cited. Only if persons most at risk of being infected are willing to come to a test
site is there an opportunity to test, to counsel and to seek cooperation in contact-tracing
programs.
Opponents of anonymous testing respond by simply denying that name reporting
will drive any significant number of people away from testing. They believe that few
would risk their health by not being tested and that statistics show that ever larger
numbers of persons are being tested.
Proponents of anonymous testing retort that the fact that more people may be
being tested tells us little about whether the people at high risk are being tested. They
argue that even if it is true that only a few would risk their health rather than be
tested, that "truth" amounts to a false dichotomy. The medical evidence shows that
6
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Anonymous testing in one form or another has been adopted in a substan-
tial number of states. 4 Though the programs are not identical they share a
common trait in allowing a person to use a code rather than a name when
infected persons may experience no symptoms for five or more years after infection. As
a result, many will perceive no need for health care for years during which time they
are themselves infectious. The argument continues that even if a person is concerned
about his HIV status, he may perceive no obvious connection between being tested and
being treated as there is no recognized cure for HIV infection as such. On the other
hand, to the extent that a person is significantly concerned about his health, what is
likely to seem important is keeping his job, home and health insurance. Non-anony-
mous testing, it is claimed, is perceived as an unacceptable threat to all of these. In
short, proponents claim that anonymous testing will make public health programs more
effective by greatly increasing the number of persons in high risk groups who come in
to get tested and, in the process, subject themselves to counseling and contact tracing
programs.
2) It is argued that identifying information is necessary in order to efficiently no-
tify infected persons about new treatment possibilities. This seems weak. Any new
treatments for AIDS or HIV infection will be major news. Moreover, persons at risk of
being infected are likely to pay very close attention to news of possible treatments.
Their health is at stake.
3) It is argued that the Department of Health might receive a report that an
identifiable person is acting unsafely. If the Department has a list of persons who have
tested positive for HIV, the list could be consulted to determine if that person's name
appeared on it. If so, the argument runs, the Department could contact this person to
counsel him about the dangers of his conduct. The implication is that the Department
would not contact an identifiable person whose name was not on the list. But why not?
Most persons who are infected will not have been tested at any given time. The fact
that a person's name is not on the list is no assurance that the person is not infected.
By hypothesis, the Department has received information that the person is acting un-
safely. Ought not the Department look into such allegations in any event?
These arguments cannot be fully resolved in empirical terms.
One of your authors has testified before various committees of the Missouri legis-
lature in favor of anonymous testing and firmly believes on the basis of his research
and experience in counseling gay men that anonymous testing is very important to an
effective AIDS control program. One final argument that has been made against anon-
ymous testing that has no basis in fact is that such a program will jeopardize federal
funding. No support has been offered for this assertion. Our investigations have pro-
duced repeated assurances that no such danger exists. Numerous other states have such
programs and have reported no difficulty receiving federal funding.
24. All but one or two states permit AIDS anonymous testing in some form in at
least one clinic in the state. Telephone interview with Tim Quinn, CDC, AIDS Division
(Oct. 14, 1988). For example, as of December 1987, Alaska, California and Texas had
only anonymous testing while Mississippi, Hawaii and Alabama allowed either anony-
mous or confidential testing. Connecticut provides for voluntary anonymous testing of
methadone patients. Telephone interview with Ron Sanders, CDC, AIDS Division
(Oct. 14, 1988). Furthermore, many states do not require any identification prior to
testing. This implies additional testing is being performed under false names, which is
essentially anonymous. For example, "Ronald Reagan" was tested ten times in one
week at one clinic. Telephone interview with Tracy Hooker, National Conference of
State Legislators, AIDS Division (Oct. 6, 1988).
1988]
7
Schultz and Reuter: Schultz: AIDS Legislation in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
being tested for HIV.2 5 Generally, the code is a number which cannot be
linked to the identity of the individual, but which is unique and which the
individual can reconstruct should recalling the number be difficult. For exam-
ple, the code might consist of the individual's birth date and the last four
digits of the social security number. Such a system would not preclude the
collection of non-identifying data such as age, sex, race, residence zip code,
sexual orientation and IV drug use. Nor would it preclude counseling or par-
ticipation in contact-tracing programs.
As noted earlier, the new law requires that anyone who seeks testing be
counseled prior to testing and at the time the results are given. 26 It further
requires that contact notification be initiated at all test sites when submitting
test results to anyone who has requested anonymous testing and has tested
positive.27 Presumably that would include counseling the infected individual as
to the importance of informing persons with whom he or she has shared IV
drug apparatus or with whom the individual has had sex of the possibility that
they may also be infected. These individuals may then seek medical advice
and counseling. In cases where the infected person does not wish to do the
notifying personally, the test cite should offer the services of trained public
health personnel to make these contacts without divulging the identity of the
infected person, if he or she so desires.28
C. Mandatory Testing
The new AIDS statute requires that all individuals delivered to the De-
partment of Corrections and Human Resources and all individuals released or
discharged from any institution operated by that Department shall undergo
HIV testing without any right of refusal before their release.29 This policy is
contrary to the recommendations of the United States Surgeon General and
several other authorities.30 The statute does not specify how the resulting in-
25. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 13.3. "A coded system that does not link individual
identity with the request or result shall be used to report the results of such testing to
the department of health." Id.
26. See supra text accompanying note 10.
27. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 13.4.
28. Not all persons will be willing to participate in contact tracing. In such cases
coercion is not likely to be effective. Loss of memory can be genuine or feigned. In
some cases, investigation might reveal an at-risk partner, but such investigations are
not likely to remain secret. For someone unwilling to have his partners contacted,
knowledge that an investigation to which consent was not given might be launched or
that penalties might be applied for failure to cooperate would be a powerful incentive
not to be tested in that jurisdiction. At least with an anonymous testing program there
is a better chance that these people will come in to be tested, thus providing an oppor-
tunity to explain the importance of voluntary participation.
29. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 4. This section also permits the Department to test
persons who are required to undergo annual or biannual physical examinations.
30. 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY
SYNDROME 33; see also CONFRONTING AIDS, supra note 12, at 15, 130.
[Vol. 53
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formation may be used. Prisoners have already sued Missouri, claiming their
isolation because of being HIV positive is unlawful. 1
Other important questions are whether test results will be considered in
determining a prisoner's eligibility for work release and parole, and if so,
whether that use is lawful. In most cases a prisoner's HIV status would have
no rational relationship to the offense for which he was convicted nor to any
rehabilitation for that offense.-2 Another possibility might be to fashion special
conditions of parole for persons who test positive. Again, it is unlikely that
such a special condition would have any rational relationship to rehabilitation
for the offense for which the person's liberty was taken. Some courts have held
that the lack of any rational connection to a legitimate rehabilitation goal ren-
ders a condition of parole unlawful.3
The statute also provides that the Department of Mental Health may per-
form HIV testing "without the right of refusal" in two situations.34 The first
concerns those participating in a methadone treatment program who have re-
fused to undergo such testing when there are "reasonable grounds to believe
that the individual is infected with HIV and is a reasonable (sic) health threat
to others." ' Since the statute does not mandate the testing of all those in
methadone treatment programs, the legislature apparently contemplated evi-
dence of something more than IV drug use as a basis of the reasonable belief
that one is infected. The second half of the standard is confused, but probably
should be read as requiring "reasonable grounds to believe that the individual
presents an unreasonable health threat to others."36 The "reasonable grounds"
standard employed here may be constitutionally required in that the extraction
of blood constitutes a fourth amendment intrusion.37 The statute does not,
however, provide that a warrant be obtained prior to the intrusion, as would
ordinarily be required. Nor do these circumstances fall comfortably into any
recognized exception to the warrant requirement.3 8
31. Boyd v. Moore, No. 87-4521-CV-C-5 (W.D. Mo. filed Nov. 25, 1987);
Macke v. Cowles, No. 86-4447-CV-C-5, (W.D. Mo. filed July 2, 1986) (as reported in
a telephone conversation with Mary Ann Sedey, co-counsel in Boyd v. Moore (Oct. 28,
1988)).
32. The Missouri legislature has authorized the Board of Probation and Parole to
condition a prisoner's release upon avoidance of other crimes and any additional re-
quirements believed to be necessary in assisting the prisoner in leading a law-abiding
life. Mo. REv. STAT. § 558.011.4(2) (1986). Missouri courts uphold all conditions im-
posed by the Board which are not illegal, immoral or impossible to perform. See, e.g.,
State v. Brantley, 353 S.W.2d 793, 796 (Mo. 1962).
33. See, e.g., In re Bushman, 1 Cal. 3d 767, 776-77, 463 P.2d 727, 733, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 375, 381 (1970); People v. Keller, 76 Cal. App. 3d 827, 838, 143 Cal. Rptr. 184,
191 (1978); In re Martinez, 86 Cal. App. 3d 577, 580, 150 Cal. Rptr. 366, 368 (1978).
34. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 5.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
38. There is no danger of the evidence disappearing as there was in Schmerber.
The search of a student by a school official, New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325
1988] 607
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The Department of Mental Health also is authorized to test persons
under its care and custody applying the same "reasonable grounds" standard
as discussed for persons in methadone treatment programs, unless such testing
"is otherwise prohibited by law." 39 In both cases test results need not be re-
ported to the Department of Health if such reporting is prohibited by federal
law.4"
Under section 9 of the statute, the Department of Health may seek a
court ordered HIV test of an individual after reasonable efforts have been
made to obtain informed consent to the testing. The request will be granted if
the Department can show that "there are reasonable grounds to believe that
an individual is infected with HIV and there is clear and convincing evidence
of a serious and present health threat to others posed by the individual if in-
fected.""' This section mandates a two-pronged standard for obtaining court
ordered HIV testing. Reasonable grounds must be shown to believe that a
person is infected with HIV. But these grounds must be combined with clear
and convincing evidence that the person presents a serious and present danger
to others. In view of the fact that the Department is required to make reasona-
ble efforts to obtain informed consent prior to seeking a court order, the hear-
ing on the order is presumably not meant to be an ex parte proceeding. None-
theless, the statute ought to make this clear and as well require state-paid
counsel for those who are indigent. One of your authors had a hand in drafting
this provision (with procedural safeguards). At the time, it was offered as a
substitute for all other mandatory testing provisions. The legislature, however,
did not see fit to use the provision in this way, and its purpose is now unclear.
Perhaps it would be used as a prelude to an attempt to isolate a person under
the public health statute; but the isolation provision is of doubtful validity be-
cause it provides no procedural safeguards."' Alternatively, it might be used in
(1985), or of an employee's desk by an employer, O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709
(1987) may furnish closer precedent. However, neither of these cases involved intrusion
into the body. Under these cases a balancing test is used. The statute does not state the
purpose of testing persons in methadone programs, nor is any apparent. Surely all ad-
dicts ought to be counseled concerning the danger of passing HIV infection. It might
be argued that the intrusion is minimal since participation in the program is voluntary.
If that is good constitutional law, it nevertheless seems bad public health policy as it
would tend to drive away the very people who ought to be in the program.
39. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 5.1(2). Arguably, there is less of a fourth amendment
problem here since the persons to be tested are in the care and custody of the Depart-
ment which must decide what sort of living arrangements are appropriate for the per-
son in question.
40. Id. § 5.2.
41. Id. § 9.
42. Mo. REV. STAT. § 192.020 (1986) gives the Department of Health the power
to make rules to prevent the spread of communicable diseases. This authorization is
utilized in Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 50-101.050(2)(g) (1984) which allows the De-
partment of Health to quarantine persons infected with communicable diseases. While
no procedural safeguards are provided by the state regulation, the Constitution would
require due process. As in cases where the state seeks to involuntarily commit someone
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conjunction with statutory civil commitment. 3
Finally, the statute permits the Department of Health to promulgate rules
providing for mandatory premarital HIV testing "if the Centers for Disease
Control so indicates. 14 4 What that indication might be is not specified, but for
now at least premarital testing is not required.4
D. Confidentiality of Test Results
Virtually all reputable authorities recommend that the results of HIV
testing should be kept confidential. The reasons cited include the general inter-
est in the privacy of personal information, the need to prevent misuse of the
information and the need to allay fears that the information will be misused."
However, the term "confidential" is hardly self-defining. It goes without say-
ing that if records which link the identity of persons tested with the test results
are to be kept at all, the real questions are who will have authorized access to
this information, under what conditions and what remedies are available for
unauthorized disclosure. The legislature attempted to answer these questions,
but was not entirely successful.
The relevant provisions of the new statute begin with a broad declaration
of confidentiality and a prohibition against disclosure of "all information...
held ... by any person ... concerning an individual's HIV infection status..
."4 The term "confidential" is not defined. Presumably, it connotes some ef-
fort to prevent disclosure or dissemination. The term "disclose" is defined in
the broadest terms.4 8 Together, these provisions prohibit any transfer by and
to any person of all information about anyone's HIV status or test results,
except as provided in the exceptions.
The first exception covers, "Public employees within the agency, depart-
ment, or political subdivision who need to know to perform their public
for mental care, the state would presumably be required to develop a procedure to
determine whether an individual is dangerous to self or others. O'Connor v. Donaldson,
442 U.S. 563 (1975); see generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, Constitu-
tional Law § 13.9, at 500-03 (3d ed. 1986).
43. The Mental Health Commissioner may detain persons who present the likeli-
hood of harming self or others upon reasonable cause that such person is mentally
disordered under Mo. REV. STAT. § 632.300.2 (1986). Such individuals may be held
under certain circumstances for one year thereafter according to Mo. REV. STAT. §
632.355 (1986).
44. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 12.
45. Mandatory pre-marital testing is not recommended by authorities in the
field. See PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 7 (mandatory pre-marital testing not
included in list of over 600 recommendations); CONFRONTING AIDS, supra note 12, at
14-15; 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYN-
DROME 33.
46. See, e.g., CONFRONTING AIDS, supra note 12, at 129-30; PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION, supra note 45, at 126-27.
47. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 3.1(1).
48. Id. § 1(1).
19881
11
Schultz and Reuter: Schultz: AIDS Legislation in Missouri
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
duties."' 9 This applies to any governmental agency. Although "need to know"
may be workable if suitably limited, it is a less than perfect limit on dissemi-
nation.50 There will be disagreements as to who, in fact, needs to know. For
example, does an employee of the Department of Health assigned to notify
contacts of those testing positive need to know? 5 Passing that, it seems clear
that some persons may have a legitimate need to know the results of HIV
tests, but not the identity of the persons involved. An example might be a
statistician in the Department of Health. Does the need to know standard re-
quire separating identity from result in these cases? Another problem is that
the statute does not specify who is to decide the issue of who needs to know.
That omission raises the question of how the need to know limitation is to be
enforced. In this vein, California's statute ensures enforcement by prohibiting
disclosure except under court order after an adversary hearing.52
The second exception is much broader in allowing disclosure to "Public
employees of other agencies, departments, or political subdivisions who need to
know to perform their public duties. ' 53 Again, what constitutes a need to know
and who will decide? Questions will arise involving police, firemen, emergency
personnel, prosecutors, probation and parole officers, public schools and hospi-
tals and others. Does a prosecutor need to know the HIV status of a person
who has been charged with intentional transmission of the AIDS virus?5 Do
parole officers need to know the HIV status of their charges?55 Do public
(mental) hospital officials ever need to know?" Do they always need to know?
Which officials? Is a concern about protecting oneself from HIV infection
enough to qualify as a need to know? Does any need disappear if the con-
cerned individual could take precautionary measures? These and other cases
must either be dealt with specifically under the statute or a decision maker
must be identified and fair procedures specified if the statute is to provide any
49. Id. § 3.1(1)(a).
50. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 127. "Health care systems have
not been inclined to define narrowly 'need to know' of identifier-linked information,
resulting in a system where safeguards against disclosure are difficult to maintain." Id.
51. The Director of the Department of Health has stated that knowledge of the
identity of persons tested is necessary to a contact tracing program. Since the contact
would not have to be told the source of his potential infection, it is not clear why
anyone needs to know that person's identity. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 12,
1988, at 2B, col. 1. But see PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 127 ("Many
persons do not understand that it is possible to warn someone about an exposure to
HIV without revealing the name or exact identity of the source of the exposure.").
52. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.20 (West 1986).
53. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 3.1(1)(b).
54. The California statute has been held to prohibit disclosure to a prosecutor for
purposes of prosecution. Barlow v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 3d 1652, 236 Cal.
Rptr. 134 (1987).
55. An earlier bill required such disclosure. But the need for such disclosure in
cases where the offense is not related to HIV infection seems questionable at best.
56. See H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 5, which allows the Department of Mental Health
to test for HIV without right of refusal under some circumstances.
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semblance of confidentiality.
The third exception covers "Persons other than public employees who are
entrusted with the regular care of those under the care and custody of a state
agency, including but not limited to operators of day care facilities, group
homes, residential care facilities and adoptive or foster parents. '51 Here there
is no limitation to those who need to know, perhaps because the legislature felt
that anyone entrusted with the regular care of those under the care and cus-
tody of the state have a sufficient need by virtue of their position.
The statute provides a further series of "exceptions" "[a]s authorized by
subsection 2 of this section."58 These will be discussed below. First, a curious
second subdivision to subsection 1 must be addressed. The subdivision pro-
vides: "(2) Further disclosure by public employees shall be governed by sub-
section 2 and 3 of this section. Public employees violating such requirements
may be subject to civil actions brought under subsection 4 [sic] of this sec-
tion.1 5 Both sentences apply only to public employees. Thus, it would seem,
further disclosure by persons other than public employees is not governed by
subsections 2 and 3. Logically, then, others are governed by the general prohi-
bition against disclosure. But if a person who is not a public employee violates
that prohibition, is there a remedy?
The second sentence quoted above tells us that if public employees violate
the requirements relating to "further disclosure" they may be the subject of
civil actions brought under subsection 4 [sic] of this section.6 0 This language
appears to exclude non public employees from such civil actions. If so, the
statute provides no remedy for unlawful disclosure by a private person. Per-
haps a remedy would lie in a common law tort action for breach of the right of
privacy.6" Or, perhaps the legislature felt that only public employees should be
57. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 3.1(1)(d).
58. Id. § 3.1(1)(d)-(2).
59. Id. § 3.1(2). It should be noted that the reference to subsection 4 should be a
reference to subsection 6.
60. See H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 3.6. Presumably, the reference to subsection 4 is a
mistake because that subsection does not deal with civil violations. The proper refer-
ence would be to subsection 6.
61. Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942), creates a right
to privacy action when the court determines the disclosed matter to be outside the
scope of public interest and the interference to be serious, unreasonable, unwarranted
and offensive. Plaintiff must then prove that defendant acted with malice and should
have realized the disclosure would be offensive to a person with ordinary sensibilities.
The Barber court upheld the plaintiff's award of damages as appropriate. In that case,
the defendant magazine had published an article about plaintiff's hospitalization for an
eating disorder. The Barber court further noted that doctor-patient confidentiality is a
necessity which deserves protection. See Barber, 348 Mo. at 1199, 159 S.W.2d at 295.
A later decision extended the Barber rationale to include cases against private
persons. Biederman's, Inc. v. Wright, 322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959). The Wright court
noted that an oral publication must be communicated to a large number of persons, not
just a few individuals. 322 S.W.2d at 898. In that case, defendant's harassment of the
plaintiff while she worked was deemed to constitute a sufficient violation of privacy to
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subject to the possibility of having to pay attorney's fees and exemplary dam-
ages. 62 However, from the point of view of the person injured by the disclo-
sure, the source of the disclosure is not likely to be significant. A better read-
ing is that this provision limits the statutory remedies for breaches by public
employees, but does not address the statutory remedies available when a per-
son other than a public employee violates this statute.
Another problem with the wording of this subdivision is that it may imply
that public employees are subject to the statutorily provided remedies only for
disclosures not authorized under subsection 2 and 3. That would leave no stat-
utory remedy for disclosures violating subsection 1, unless they also happened
to violate subsection 2 or 3. Of course, it can be argued that the remedies
section is drafted broadly enough to cover any injury resulting from a violation
of any of the confidentiality provisions,"3 but to conclude that any violation of
the confidentiality provisions is covered, the second sentence of this subdivision
must be ignored. The statute ought to clearly provide remedies for any breach
of its provisions by any person.
We turn, then, to subsection 2, where liability for disclosure may ensue
only if "the person acted in bad faith or with conscious disregard ..." The
problem here is that the statute specifies no referent. For example, a person
who acts in bad faith or with conscious disregard and discloses an individual's
HIV status to the Department of Health, is not exempted from liability for
"violating any duty or right of confidentiality established by law . ."" Bad
faith with respect to what? Conscious disregard of what? No sensible interpre-
tation of this provision comes to mind. In other words, it is not clear under
what circumstances, if any, a person may be liable for disclosing another's
HIV status to the Department of Health.
Perhaps some meaning can be ascribed to the statutory language if we
assume that it is a mistake of fact with respect to which a person must act in
bad faith or conscious disregard in order to be liable for disclosure. For exam-
ple, under the statute one is exempt from liability if there is no action in bad
faith or conscious disregard when disclosing an individual's HIV status "(b)
To health care personnel working directly with the infected individual who
have a reasonable need to know the results for the purpose of providing direct
patient health care."66 Assume the person disclosing the information is
establish a claim. Thus, if the courts determined that an individual's HIV status is
beyond the scope of public interest and the disclosure is a serious, unreasonable, unwar-
ranted and offensive interference, a right to privacy action could be maintained against
a private individual. If the plaintiff could also demonstrate that the defendant had ei-
ther written or orally communicated plaintiffs HIV status to a large number of per-
sons, the plaintiff would be entitled to a favorable verdict.
62. See H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 3.6 which allows for both exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.
63. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 3.6.
64. Id. § 3.2(1).
65. Id. § 3.2(1)-(1)(a).
66. Id. § 3.2(l)(b).
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mistaken and there is no "reasonable need to know"? It could be argued that
there is nonetheless protection from liability unless the "mistake" was made in
bad faith or with conscious disregard of an unacceptable risk that there was no
such reasonable need. If so, the wording of this subsection could have been
much clearer. Mistake of fact is not mentioned. Nor is there any mention of
"risk." Still, what other meaning can reasonably be given to this language?
Assuming the correctness of the above interpretation, one may disclose
another's HIV status in several other circumstances without liability, even if
the actor is mistaken concerning some aspect of relevant fact, unless there is a
bad faith or conscious disregard of an unacceptable risk by the actor that he is
mistaken. These are:
(c) Pursuant to the written authorization of the subject of the test result or
results;
(d) To the spouse of the subject of the test result or results;
(e) To the subject of the test result or results;
(f) To the parent or legal guardian or custodian of the subject of the testing, if
the subject is an unemancipated minor.67
Negligent disclosure would not be covered. Given these problems, section
3.2(1) should be clarified or eliminated.
The next subdivision of this subsection (section 3.2(2)), is apparently a
response to Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, discussed ear-
lier.68 It provides that paragraphs (b) and (d) do not create a duty to disclose
HIV test results to persons potentially exposed to the virus.6" As noted earlier,
Missouri Department of Health regulations impose a duty to disclose to house-
hold members on attending physicians. 70
Section 3.2(3) prohibits further disclosure of test results by those who
received such results under paragraphs (b) and (c).71 The implication is that a
spouse, parent or legal guardian may further disclose test results. That impli-
cation may be at odds with subdivisions (1) and (2) of subsection 1, discussed
above.7 '
The next subdivision, section 3.2(4), represents a change from an earlier
bill which required that HIV test results be kept in a separate part of a per-
son's medical record accessible only to physicians and mental health personel
on the basis of need to know.7 HIV test results are now to be treated as other
information in a person's health record.74 This type of treatment will result in
broader dissemination than is necessary. For example, it is not uncommon for
insurance companies to request all medical records for a given period as a
67. Id. § 3.2(1).
68. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
69. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 3.2(2).
70. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
71. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 3.2(3).
72. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
73. H.B. 1044, § 4.2(5), 84th Gen. Assembly (1988).
74. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 3.2(4).
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condition of paying a claim. If not clearly necessary and relevant to the matter
at hand, a positive HIV test result delivered to a health or life insurer may
well result in unwarranted attempts by the insurance company to terminate
the policy, to "investigate" claims interminably, to challenge claims unreason-
ably or otherwise to stall and harass the insured.7 5 Moreover, medical records
such as hospital charts are frequently available to persons who have no need to
know, and sometimes no business knowing, another's HIV status. Any hospital
visitor knows that charts are frequently available in a patient's room, where
cleaning personnel and the idly curious may have easy access. These disclo-
sures may result in just as much injury to the patient as any other, yet they
are not guarded against.
Subsection 3 (or section 3.3) provides: "All communications between the
subject of HIV testing and a physician, hospital, or person authorized by the
department of health to perform or conduct HIV testing shall be privileged
communications." 76 Several aspects of this provision are of note. First, it ap-
plies to communications between the named parties without limitation. Read
literally, it would cover discussion of social plans or even plans to rob a bank.
Presumably, the legislature intended to cover only conversations in some way
related to health matters. But without statutory specification, how narrowly
will the protection be read? Second, it is not clear why the protection should
be limited to persons who have received Department of Health authorization
to perform HIV blood sampling. Why should the patient be left unprotected if
the health care professional has not been certified? Finally, the statute makes
covered conversations "privileged" rather than confidential. Neither term is
defined in the statute, but a privilege frequently refers to a right to prevent
testimony in court, whereas confidentiality may apply to any kind of communi-
cation."' If such a distinction was intended here, it is not clear why. It would
be much better to define such important terms. 8
Subsection 5, (or section 3.5) on the other hand,79 requires anyone who
tests positive for HIV to disclose that result to any health care professional
before receiving services from that professional.80 Though it is clear that this
provision is designed to protect health care professionals, it is loosely drawn.
"Health care professional" is not defined. Nor is there any limitation of the
75. Benjamin Schatz, Director of the National Gay Rights Advocates
("NGRA") alleges that the insurance industry, "engages in widespread anti-gay dis-
crimination, and frequently discriminates against policy-holders with AIDS through
delaying tactics, unfair exclusions, and denial of claims." NGRA Newsletter, Summer
1988. In response, the NGRA has filed several complaints against a number of insur-
ance companies. NGRA Newsletter, Spring 1987.
76. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 3.3.
77. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2286 (McNaugh-
ton ed. 1961).
78. See supra note 52.
79. Subsection 4 is noted as part of the discussion of reporting requirements. See
supra note 13.
80. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 3.5.
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required disclosure to situations where the virus could be transferred. 8' Even
though broadly drafted, this provision is not likely to be effective. Many will
be unaware of it. Even if aware, some may not disclose their HIV status if
they believe disclosure will result in denial of services, which is not an uncom-
mon scenario.8 2
Subsection 6 (section 3.6) provides that:
Any individual who is injured as a result of a violation of this
section may bring a civil action for damages. If it is found in a civil
action that:
(1) A person has negligently violated this section, the person is
liable for:
(a) Actual damages; and
(b) Court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the
person bringing the action; or
(2) Any person who demonstrates a conscious disregard or has
willfully violated this section, is liable for:
(a) Actual damages;
(b) Exemplary damages; and
(c) Court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the
person bringing the action.83
Thus, a plaintiff must show at least negligence in violating the provisions of
Section 3 to make the conduct actionable under this subsection. Further, as
discussed earlier, the disclosures enumerated in Section 3.2 cannot result in
liability unless the person acted "in bad faith or conscious disregard . .. ."
Consequently, the only remedy provided is found in subsection 6.(2), which
requires a showing of conscious disregard or willfulness.8 4 Also, as discussed
earlier, there is some question whether the legislature intended to impose any
penalty on the general public for disclosure of another's HIV status.8" Beyond
these caveats, these statutory remedies are designed to be effective enforce-
ment measures in that court costs and reasonable attorney's fees are available
to victorious plaintiffs. A further obstacle could have been eliminated by set-
ting statutory minimum damages, but this option was not taken.
Subsection 7 (section 3.7) provides broad civil immunity for health care
providers who report the identity of a person to the Department of Health who
they reasonably believe to be HIV positive.8 The Act also grants them immu-
nity for good faith cooperation in Department of Health investigations to
81. Id. It is generally accepted that transmission requires that some bodily fluid
of the infected person enter the blood stream of another for transmission to be possible.
See Schultz, supra note 11, at 67.
82. See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 126.
83. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 3.6.
84. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
85. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
86. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 3.7.
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determine whether a person should undergo mandatory testing and in judicial
proceedings arising out of such investigations. Few would deny that some sort
of civil immunity is necessary to obtain the cooperation of health care provid-
ers in such activities. The more basic issues are whether the Department of
Health needs the authority to seek mandatory testing and whether the policy
such authority reflects is sufficiently important to override confidentiality inter-
ests. The legislature has answered both in the affirmative. Presumably, the
Department will use this authority judiciously. There should be very few cases
where mandatory testing is warranted in that mandatory testing of this sort is
generally associated with other coercive measures to protect the public health,
such as isolation or quarantine. It should also be pointed out that this statute
does not authorize coercive "judicial proceedings" beyond obtaining an order
to test, though an earlier bill did. 7
The last subsection of Section 3 (section 3.8) requires that a "licensed
facility"88 notify the employer of a firefighter, police officer or "emergency
medical person"8 9 that such person has been "exposed" to a patient during
rescue, treatment or transportation who is diagnosed as having a "reportable
infectious or contagious disease as defined by the department of health." 90 It
further requires the facility to notify mortuary personnel involved in removal
of a deceased patient who was so diagnosed. Notification is to be done in a
manner that protects the confidentiality of both patient and employee. The
subsection directs the employer to request the employee to contact the licensed
facility to receive appropriate medical direction.
By this provision the legislature undertook to notify certain persons of
their exposure to certain transmissible infections, 91 including HIV, while also
protecting confidentiality. However, the provision is both overbroad and under-
inclusive. It is overbroad, or at least vague, in that the term "exposed" is not
defined. Transmission of HIV, for example, may be accomplished only when
the bodily fluid of an infected person enters the blood stream of another. 92
87. See H. COMM. SUBST. H.B. Nos. 1151 & 1044, [perfected] § 16, 84th Gen.
Assembly (1988).
88. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 3.8(l)(b) defines "Licensed facility" as "a facility li-
censed under chapter 197, RSMo, or a nursing home licensed under chapter 198,
RSMo."
89. Id. § 3.8(l)(a) provides:
"Emergency medical person", any person trained and authorized by law or
rule to render emergency medical assistance or treatment such as but not
exclusively limited to emergency first responders, ambulance attendants and
attendant-drivers, emergency medical technicians, mobile emergency medical
technician, emergency medical technician-paramedics, registered nurses, or
physicians....
90. Id. § 3.8(2).
91. The requirement is not limited to HIV infection, but rather includes the en-
tire list of diseases contained in Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 13, § 50-101.020 (1983) as modi-
fied by Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 19, § 20-20.020 (1986).
92. See Schultz, supra note 11, at 67 n.12; see also ALI-ABA, AIDS AND THE
LAW 8 (1986); 1986 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFI-
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Reading exposure more broadly will include cases where no danger of trans-
mission exists. In such cases, the patient's confidentiality will be needlessly
breached. Further, at least in the case of possible HIV infection, there is no
currently accepted medical treatment for someone who has been recently in-
fected. In the future there may be one or more treatments. At that time there
would be a better case for early notification.
The provision is also arguably underinclusive because it does not cover
ordinary citizens who engage in rescue operations or other activities compara-
ble to those covered by the statute. If and when effective early treatment be-
comes available, there would be a strong case for notification of anyone truly
in danger of having been infected. This "problem" of notification may become
less of an issue if tests become available which will reveal whether a person
has been infected almost immediately after the suspected incident.
Section 15 of the statute contains a conditional mandatory notification of
school officials.9 3 Under this section the Department of Health as well as the
parent or guardian of a child must notify the superintendent of the relevant
school district or the chief administrative official of a non-public school of a
student's positive HIV status. However, this is required only after the school
has adopted a policy consistent with the recommendations of the Centers for
Disease Control on school children who test positive for HIV.94 The superin-
tendent or chief administrator may, in turn, notify those persons:
(a) who are designated by the school district to determine the fitness
of an individual to attend school;
(b) who have a reasonable need to know the identity of the child in
order to provide proper health care.95
This section is an improvement over earlier versions in several ways. First,
disclosure is conditioned on adopting CDC recommendations which follow
generally accepted medical principles concerning transmissibility of the virus.
Generally, these recommendations favor keeping a child in school unless there
is evidence of some peculiar risk to the child or others. Secondly, although
clause (b) above may be difficult to interpret and is, perhaps, subject to some
abuse; it is more tightly drawn than an earlier version.96
II. ANTIDISCRIMINATION
Both the Presidential Commission97 and the prestigious Institute of
CIENCY SYNDROME 9-10, 13-14; cf. CONFRONTING AIDS, supra note 12, at 39.
93. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 15.
94. Education and Foster Care of Children Infected with Human T-Lympho-
tropic Virus type IIl/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus, 34 MORBIDITY & MORTAL-
ITY WKLY. REP. 517 (1985).
95. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 15.
96. H.B. 1044, § 2.3(2), 84th Gen. Assembly (1988).
97. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 7, recommendation 9-4, at 123.
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Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences,98 among others, strongly favor
legislation prohibiting discrimination against persons infected with HIV in
housing, employment, public accommodations and the delivery of social ser-
vices. Such discrimination is not justified, whether based on fear of contagion
or dislike for the groups most affected by the disease. Fear of discrimination is
also a substantial barrier to effective public health measures which depend on
persons coming forward for testing, counseling, treatment and epidemiological
purposes. 99
One of your authors observed a number of the legislative hearings on the
various bills which ultimately resulted in the current AIDS statute. An un-
scientific opinion based on these observations is that the great majority of wit-
nesses favored antidiscrimination legislation. The legislature responded with
the following provision:
Provisions of chapter 213, Revised Statutes of Missouri, shall apply to
individuals with HIV infection, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome related complex; provided
that such protection shall not include an individual who has a cur-
rently contagious disease or infection and who, by reason of such dis-
ease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health or
safety of other individuals or who, by reason of the currently conta-
gious disease or infection, is unable to perform the duties of their
employment.'
This provision came to its present form via amendment on the floor of the
House. That amendment added the language following the semicolon and de-
leted language which would have allowed a person aggrieved by unlawful dis-
crimination to choose between filing a Human Rights Commission complaint
with the Human Rights Commission or filing suit in circuit court. Chapter 213
requires a person to file a complaint first and allows the filing of a law suit
only if the Commission fails to act within one-hundred and eighty days. 10'
Giving an aggrieved person a choice of remedy was designed by the author of
the pre-amendment version (one of your authors) to reduce the drain on the
resources of the Commission while at the same time allowing for a choice of
strategy in the hope that this would increase the effectiveness of the provision.
As written, less enforcement seems inevitable. Less enforcement, or concern
about it, can only undercut efforts to have persons tested and to get them to
participate in contact tracing. Thus the amendment runs counter to the public
health interests of the state.
The other amendment tracks the language of the Harkin-Humphrey
amendment to the federal Civil Rights Restoration Act.102 It appears merely
98. CONFRONTING AIDS, supra note 12, at 135.
99. See, e.g., id. at 125; see also PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 7, at
119.
100. H.B..1151 & 1044, § 6.
101. Mo. REv. STAT. § 213.075 (1986).
102. PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 122:
[Vol. 53
20
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 53, Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss4/2
AIDS ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
to restate legal principles embodied in chapter 213 prohibiting discrimination
against the handicapped in housing, employment and public accommodations.
The original provision was designed to bring AIDS, ARC (AIDS related com-
plex) and simple infection with HIV within the definition of handicap con-
tained in chapter 213.103 However, prohibiting discrimination does not mean
prohibiting any and all distinctions. Discrimination is defined as "any unfair
treatment based on race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, sex, age as it
relates to employment or handicap."'1 4 The term "unfair" is not defined in the
statute, but ordinarily, unfair treatment connotes treatment based on consider-
ations not related to the merits of the matter at hand. Thus, it seems unlikely
that a valid claim exists under chapter 213 based on action taken against the
complainant where that action was a reasonable way of preventing "a direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals."' 05 Similarly, a person who
is "unable to perform the duties of [his/her] employment"' 0 6 would have no
claim to retain that employment under chapter 213. In neither case would the
action constitute unfair treatment, i.e., discrimination. In short, the amend-
ment to Section 6, does not conflict with or change chapter 213, but rather
reaffirms its basic principles.117
Looking at HIV infection specifically, the medical evidence is strong that
one who is infected does not pose a "direct threat to the health or safety" of
others in most everyday situations. The transmission of the virus can occur
only when the blood or other bodily fluids of the infected person enter the
blood stream of another.108 Denying a person infected with HIV housing, em-
ployment or public accommodation because of fear of contagion constitutes
prohibited discrimination in most situations because it has no justification in
A recently enacted provision of law (the Harkin-Humphrey amendment to
the Civil Rights Restoration Act) was intended to clarify the application of
Section 504 (of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973) in the employment context in
terms of persons with contagious diseases. It states that "for the purposes of
Sections 503 and 504, as such sections relate to employment, such term does
not include an individual who has a currently contagious disease or infection
and who, by reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a direct
threat to the health or safety of other individuals or who, by reason of the
currently contagious disease or infection, is unable to perform the duties of
the job." It appears that this amendment is in concert with the Arline,
(School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 107 S. Ct. 1123 (1987)) decision
and codifies the existing standards applicable to Section 504. Section 504
prohibits discrimination against persons with disabilities by entities receiving
federal financial assistance. The Arline decision held that a person with a
contagious disease could be protected by section 504 as a handicapped person.
103. Mo. REv. STAT. § 213.010(8) (1986).
104. Id. § 213.010(2) (emphasis added).
105. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 6.
106. Id.
107. See also Mo. CODE REGs. tit. 4, § 180.3.060 (1980) concerning handicap
discrimination in employment.
108. See Schultz, supra note 11, at 67 n.12.
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medical fact. There is no direct threat to others.109
It is also a medical fact that persons infected with HIV are usually as
mentally and physically fit as they were before infection for an extended pe-
riod of time, frequently in excess of five years.110 During that period, it could
not be said that such a person "by reason of the currently contagious disease
or infection, is unable to perform the duties of their employment." '
III. EDUCATION
Section 7 of the Act contains a broad directive to the Departments of
Health and of Elementary and Secondary Education to prepare educational
programs "regarding means of transmission and prevention and treatment of
the HIV virus."''1 2 Subsection 2 (section 7.2) mandates that none of the pro-
grams or materials "promote behavior that is an offense" under state laws
prohibiting sex or drug offenses and state or local law prohibiting prostitution
or patronizing prostitution. There is an obvious potential conflict since trans-
mission is accomplished mainly by sexual conduct and the sharing of intrave-
nous drug paraphernalia. The question may arise as to the appropriate place
instruction on the function and use of condoms plays in these educational pro-
grams and materials. Questions may also arise with respect to materials and
programs designed to reach specific audiences. For example, a program
designed to reach drug addicts might look quite different from one designed to
reach high school students. It is important that the best advice available be
used in developing these educational materials. They are useless unless the
designated audiences actually learn from them. While advocating or actively
promoting crime is an inappropriate educational goal, prevention of the spread
of disease is a most appropriate and important goal. The statute sets up no
mechanism for resolving differences on this issue. The statute is, however,
quite specific on the minimum content of the educational programs and mater-
ials.1 3 A reading of these requirements demonstrates that more than
109. Of course, one could always imagine the transmission of the virus through a
bizarre set of circumstances. But to allow such imagined dangers to be characterized as
a "direct threat" would, it is submitted, do violence to the plain meaning of the
language.
110. See ALI-ABA, AIDS AND THE LAW 108, 586 (1986); cf. 1986 SURGEON
GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 12.
111. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 6.
112. Id. § 7.
113. Id. The Bill states:
1. The department of health shall prepare public education and awareness
plans and programs for the general public, and the department of elementary
and secondary education shall prepare educational programs for public
schools, regarding means of transmission and prevention and treatment of the
HIV virus. The plans and programs shall include, but not be limited to:
(1) Medically correct, age specific, transmission and prevention programs
for use at the discretion of the public schools beginning with students at the
sixth grade level. The educational programs shall stress moral responsibility in
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preaching abstinence was contemplated with respect to educating people on
the "means of transmission and prevention" of transmission of the virus in the
community.
IV. (NON)REGULATION OF INSURERS
Section 8 provides that "No other section of this act shall apply to any
insurer, health services corporation, or health maintenance organization li-
censed by the division of insurance which conducts HIV testing only for the
purposes of assessing a person's fitness for insurance coverage ....,""I There
is only one exception. The antidiscrimination provisions apply to these organi-
zations in their capacity as employers." 5 This is most extraordinary, as there
is no obvious reason why a blanket exception ought to be granted to the provi-
sions of a statute which attempts to deal comprehensively with a grave public
health problem.
The AIDS statute mandates state approval and regulation of laboratories
allowed to do testing for HIV, except when the testing is done for insurance
purposes." 6 The statute requires reporting of positive test results to the
and restraint from sexual activity and avoidance of controlled substance use
whereby HIV can be transmitted;
(2) Risk reduction programs for specific populations at high risk of HIV
infection;
(3) Educational programs on transmission and prevention of HIV infec-
tion in the work place for use by employers;
(4) Personal protection procedures for use by health care providers and
others in close contact with potentially infected individuals;
(5) General public information programs and circulars containing factual
information that will allow the public at large to assess its risk and develop
informed individual judgment and behavior. The department shall prepare for
free distribution among the residents of the state printed information concern-
ing the means of transmission of the HIV virus, the dangers from HIV infec-
tion, means of prevention, and the necessity for testing; and
(6) Develop presentations for community service and school organiza-
tions describing the medical and psychosocial aspects of HIV infection, in-
cluding information on how infection is transmitted and can be prevented.
2. None of the plans, programs or printed information prepared or provided
under this section shall promote behavior that is an offense in violation of
chapter 566, RSMo, concerning sexual offenses; is an offense involving the use
of a controlled substance as defined in chapter 195, RSMo; is an offense in
violation of section 568.020, RSMo, concerning incest; or is an offense in vio-
lation of any city, county or state law prohibiting prostitution or patronizing
prostitution.
114. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 8.
115. Id.
116. Having been exempted from § 2 of the Act which subjects other HIV test-
ing to Department of Health quality controls (H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 2.), testing by
insurance companies is relegated to the general requirements of the federal Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Act of 1967 and the general proficiency testing of named
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Department of Health, except when the results were obtained for insurance
purposes.11 The statute contains elaborate confidentiality requirements with
special statutory remedies, but not for insurance organizations. Instead there is
a simple mandate of non-disclosure except as authorized by the person in
question. One seeking insurance may find it very difficult to insist on non-
disclosure. If an insurance company breaches a duty of confidentiality, the
injured party may not make use of the statutory remedies to file suit for dam-
ages. Rather, such breach is treated as an unlawful trade practice to be dealt
with administratively by the Department of Insurance. Whereas other individ-
uals and businesses may not unfairly discriminate against a person infected
with HIV in the provision of public accommodations (services offered to the
public), the insurance industry is exempted.
As to HIV testing, Section 8.3. states that "The director of the division of
insurance shall establish by regulation standards for the use of HIV testing by
insurers, health services corporations and health maintenance organizations."18
Important issues lurk here. Three jurisdictions have legislatively prohibited the
use of HIV testing for the purposes of determining insurance coverage." 9 If
HIV testing is to be allowed, what tests will be required? The inexpensive test,
known as the ELISA test, can return as many as nine false positives for every
true positive when administered to low risk populations, especially when there
is less than strict quality controls.120 Yet when exclusion of risky applicants is
the goal, there is little incentive to go beyond the initial, inexpensive ELISA
test.
V. CRIMINAL PROHIBITIONS
Section 10 makes it a class D felony'2 ' to:
(1) Be or attempt to be a blood, organ, sperm or tissue donor except
as deemed necessary for medical research; or
(2) Deliberately create a grave and unjustifiable risk of infecting an-
other with HIV through sexual or other contact when an individual
knows that he is creating that risk.122
117. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 8.5, provides in part:
Such result or results shall however, be disclosed to a physician designated by
the subject of the test. If there is no physician designated, the insurer, health
services corporation, or health maintenance organization shall disclose the
identity of individuals residing in Missouri having a confirmed positive HIV
test result to the department of health.
118. Id. § 8.3.
119. California, Massachusetts, and Washington, D.C. statutorily forbid the use
of HIV testing for insurance purposes according to Manor & Mosley, State Drafts
AIDS Rules, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 5, 1988, at 6A, col. 3.
120. Okie, Study Faults Lab Accuracy in Testing AIDS Infection, Washington
Post, Oct. 27, 1987, at 25.
121. Mo. Rav. STAT. § 558.011.1(4) (1986) provides a maximum term of 5 years
imprisonment for a class D felony.
122. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 10.11.
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There is likely to be little disagreement with subsection (1). By now, anyone
who knows they are infected with HIV is almost certain to be aware of the
grave danger of infecting others through donating body parts or fluids. Such
danger, culpably created, surely warrants criminal sanction as a deterrent.
It might be argued, however, that it is unlikely that anyone would actu-
ally be infected in such circumstances because tests would be run on the
donated material to determine HIV status. Thus the donor many actually have
acted believing that this conduct would endanger no one and therefore no real
criminal culpability is shown. There is some force to this argument. Theoreti-
cally, an infected blood donor might be making the donation solely to obtain
payment for the blood believing that the blood would be thrown out after be-
ing tested. But it seems unlikely that a person who would so carefully calcu-
late would overlook the possibility that the blood would somehow not be
discarded.
If there is genuine doubt about a person's culpability, it is more likely to
be on the issue of whether that person in fact knew he was infected with HIV.
Of course, there would be no problem if there was good evidence that the
person in question had been tested and informed of the positive test results. In
the absence of such evidence, or of an admission, there may not be good evi-
dence of the person's knowledge. An attempt to infer knowledge from evidence
of life style should be avoided here. For example, it might be argued that
evidence that a person is an intravenous drug abuser tends to prove circum-
stantially that such people know their HIV status. But the inference is, at best,
very weak, while the potential for prejudice is extremely high. The problem
could be avoided by making notification of test results an element of the of-
fense, as was done in one piece of model legislation. 123
The second subdivision may prove to be more controversial. It criminal-
izes certain risky conduct by one knowing he is infected with HIV even though
that conduct does not injure anyone.124 It is, in short, an inchoate offense like
attempt or reckless driving. The rationales which typically underlie such of-
fenses posit that conduct that creates a grave risk of injury ought to be de-
terred whether it happens to result in injury or not.'25 There is an obvious
appeal to this logic. In fact, the Missouri Criminal Code provides: "A person
commits the crime of assault in the third degree if: .. . (4) He recklessly
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death or serious physical
injury to another person .... 1" This offense provides misdemeanor penalties
123. See Robinson, AIDS and the Criminal Law: Traditional Approaches and a
New Statutory Proposal, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91 (1985).
124. "These offenses take on particular importance in the context of the discus-
sion here [AIDS], because proving that the conduct of a particular actor caused an-
other person to become infected with the AIDS virus may be difficult or impossible in
many situations." Schultz, supra note 11, at 98 and accompanying notes.
125. Id. at 97 n.161 and accompanying text.
126. Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.070.1 (1986).
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for essentially the same type of conduct covered by the provision now consid-
ered.127 One of your authors testified before legislative committees considering
this legislation that additional criminal provisions were unnecessary, but that
advice was not accepted.
As enacted, the new provision is designed to clarify and narrow the lan-
guage of an earlier version which made it an offense to deliberately "expose"
another to infection with HIV when the actor knows another person could
"potentially" be infected."2 " These terms are so broad that almost any conduct
by anyone who is aware of their HIV infection might come within its sweep.
For example, it might be argued that infected persons would be guilty under
this section if they were to ride a bus. In so doing they are "deliberately expos-
ing" others to the "known potential" danger of becoming infected, if the bus
were to crash and somehow, in the process, the blood of the infected party
were to enter the bloodstream of another passenger. Of course, given what we
know about the transmissibility of HIV, the likelihood of this scenario ever
coming to pass is essentially zero. But if the language is so broad, it offers
little guidance in more realistic cases. This is particularly critical in situations
such as those involving the AIDS virus because there is widespread misunder-
standing about the circumstances under which the virus can be transmitted.12 9
Also, there is near hysteria about the disease in some quarters20 and many of
those infected are or are believed to be members of very unpopular minori-
ties.131 This creates grave danger of overbroad application of such statutes.13 2
In order, then, to minimize the chance of overly broad application, the
statutory language was revised by one of your authors to require that the state
prove that the actor deliberately created a grave and unjustifiable risk of
127. Id. § 565.070.2 (1986). Why then a special provision? It is, of course, im-
possible to divine the collective reasoning of the legislature. But at least some of the
history is objectively determinable. An early bill provided that: "It shall be unlawful
for any individual knowingly infected with HIV to . . . [d]eliberately expose another
individual with the danger of being infected with HIV through sexual contact or other-
wise when such individual knows that he could potentially communicate HIV to an-
other individual through his activity." H.B. No. 1044, § 6.3. Asked to review the bill,
this author (Schultz) felt that this provision swept much too broadly and was unneces-
sary in view of the assault provision noted above. In discussions with other persons
interested in the legislation it appeared, however, that it was likely that a bill would
pass and would contain criminal sanctions for conduct risking transmission of HIV.
Thus, a revised provision was prepared which became part of a substitute bill. H.
COMM. SUBST. H.B. Nos. 1151 & 1044, § 17.1(3). The language of this provision was
carried over into the Bill, as enacted, but without the following exclusion: "However,
this provision shall not be construed to prohibit conduct between consenting adults
where the infected party has disclosed any danger of infecting the other of which he is
aware and has obtained an agreement from the other to the conduct."
128. Id.
129. See Schultz, supra note 11, at 104 n.187.
130. See id. at 89 n.122.
131. See id. at 109 nn.210-211.
132. See id. at 108-10.
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infecting another knowing that the risk is created. This is not an offense that
can be committed negligently. The actor must be shown to have been subjec-
tively aware of the grave risk that was created and nevertheless went forward
and ran that risk. More specifically, the actor must be shown to have known
his HIV status and that the conduct created a grave and unjustifiable risk of
infecting another. And for good reason. For example, there is a high
probability that a person who regularly shares IV drug paraphernalia with
others may be infected. If such persons are unaware of the risk of being in-
fected or are unaware that they may transmit such an infection through un-
protected intercourse, criminal penalties will do nothing to deter such conduct.
On the other hand, if the actor knows the grave and unjustifiable risk involved
and goes ahead anyway, he or she has demonstrated the type of conduct that
ought to be deterred, even if no one is injured by it on that particular occasion.
This leaves the question of the nature of the risk of which the actor must
be aware. The statute describes it as "grave and unjustifiable." It has been
demonstrated that HIV can be transmitted through unprotected vaginal and
anal intercourse and by the infusion of infected blood into the bloodstream of
another.133 Other conduct might, theoretically, transmit the virus, but has not
been shown to do so.1" Furthermore, the degree of risk may vary widely de-
pending on the conduct involved. There may, for example, be a substantial
difference in risk created by a kiss and a bite. From what we know, however, it
is submitted that the risk associated with either is minimal to non-existent and
therefore would not be considered "grave,""35 and thus would not support
criminal liability under this provision.
Finally, the risk must have been unjustifiable. This requirement was taken
from the concept of recklessness in the Model Penal Code"' and the Missouri
Code."37 But the idea has deeper roots."38 It can be forcefully argued that the
degree of risk creation that warrants criminal liability cannot adequately be
evaluated without considering the purpose of the conduct and the circum-
stances known to the actor. For example, exceeding the posted speed limit
where there is heavy pedestrian traffic might be viewed as reckless driving if
133. See id. at 67 n.12.
134. Id.
135. The concentration of HIV in saliva is very low, making the likelihood of
transmission in that way very remote. See id. at 67 n.12. In fact, preliminary research
conducted by the National Institute of Dental Research indicates that saliva may actu-
ally prevent the AIDS virus from infecting cells. Thus, the lack of HIV cases transmit-
ted through kissing and biting is understandable. State AIDS Reports #3, May-June
1988, at 4, col. 2.
136. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). See
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 commentary, at 236-40 (1985). See also Schultz, supra
note 11, at 86-93.
137. Mo. REv. STAT. § 562.016.4 (1986).
138. See, e.g., LAFAVE & Scorr, CRIMINAL LAW 233 (2d ed. 1986); G. WIL-
LIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW § 26 (2d ed. 1961); Wechsler & Michael, A Rationale of the
Law of Homicide, 37 COLUM. L. REvIEw 742-51 (1937).
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done for thrills, but as within acceptable risk creation if done to bring a criti-
cally injured person to the hospital. Similarly, if a person infected with HIV
were to disclose his condition and the nature of the risk involved in sexual
intercourse to his partner and obtained the partner's consent before engaging
in intercourse, the risk run might well be considered justifiable.139 Certainly, it
could be more readily justified than if there had been no disclosure.
Thus, a "grave and unjustifiable" risk requires consideration of not only
the magnitude of the risk, but also the nature of the injury risked and the
social value of the conduct. This is the jury's task, assuming a submissable
case is made. Prosecutors and judges will have to take special care here, as
some conduct which may risk transmission of HIV, particulary sexual con-
duct, may be viewed as having very different "social value" by various groups
in the community. 140 Negative reactions may run so high in some instances
that careful attempts to apply the prescribed legal standard may give way to
irrational fears and personal prejudices.141 Prosecutions tainted in this way
would not only be unjust but also would be counterproductive, as they would
drive risky conduct further underground.
Criminal sanctions ought not to be viewed as a weapon of first resort in
the fight against the spread of this disease (or any other). Rather they should
be reserved for those cases where the evidence of criminal intent is strong
139. See Schultz, supra note 11, at 105-08. The legislature deleted the following
language contained in House Committee Substitute for H.B. Nos. 1151 & 1044,
§ 17.1(3): "However, this provision shall not be construed to prohibit conduct between
consenting adults where the infected party has disclosed any danger of infecting the
other of which he is aware and has obtained an agreement from the other to the con-
duct." That deletion may be viewed as disapproving a formal defense of consent. It
does not, however, change the fact that the risk run must be proved to be unjustifiable
to support a conviction. Whether the defendant disclosed the risk involved is logically
relevant to this issue. To arbitrarily exclude such relevant evidence could only discour-
age conduct we should be seeking to encourage in the interest of public health, as
disclosure would likely lead to the taking of precautions to prevent transmission.
140. See, e.g., P. BLUMSTEIN & R. SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 193, 201
(1983):
Sexuality is an important element in the lives and relationships of all four
types of couples [married and unmarried heterosexual couples and gay and
lesbian couples]. For all four kinds of couples, sex functions as a complex
bond between the partners, and for all "a good sex life is central to a good
overall relationship." Married or not, heterosexual or homosexual, having sex
is an act that is rarely devoid of larger meaning for a couple, it always says
something about partners' feelings about each other, what kind of values they
share, and the purpose for their relationship.
Id.; see also Amicus Curiae brief of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), The Philadel-
phia Yearly Meeting of Friends, The American Friends Service Committee, The Uni-
tarian Universalist Association, Office for Church Society of the United Church of
Christ, The Right Reverend Paul Moore, Jr., at 10, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986) ("There is no contemporary consensus about the objective morality of sexual
unorthodoxy.").
141. See Schultz, supra note 11, at 136 n.134 and accompanying text.
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enough to minimize the possible influence of personal prejudice and to maxi-
mize the support of all responsible segments of the community. That support is
essential to ensure that those at risk of being infected with HIV will come
forward and be tested, treated and counseled.1 42 Virtually all public health
authorities agree that voluntary cooperation and education are our best weap-
ons against the spread of this virus.
1 43
VI. NUISANCE ABATEMENT
Section 14.4 of the Missouri AIDS legislation gives the Department of
Health the power to bring an action to enjoin and abate certain operations
declared to be nuisances under that section. The statute addresses any place
"used for the purpose of lewdness, assignation, or illegal purpose involving sex-
ual or other contact through which transmission of HIV infection can occur."
A business meeting these standards may be shut down for up to one year
under section 14.3.144
Prior to this statute, local governing bodies possessed the general ability
to enact ordinances declaring structures to be nuisances when deemed to be
detrimental to residents' health, safety or welfare.145 Further provisions permit
the closing of certain specific nuisances such as gambling houses,1 48 prostitu-
tion houses,1 47 and places used for the illegal sale or usage of drugs.,48 Cities
and towns also have the power to enact "health laws to prevent the spread of
venereal diseases." 149 Presumably, then, the authority which Section 14 pur-
ports to give is currently enjoyed without its specific grant. This legislation
merely standardizes the power within one body-the Department of Health. It
also gives a direct grant of the power to declare as nuisances any operations
where AIDS could be transmitted, rather than requiring reliance on authority
given indirectly by the already existing statutes. It is generally assumed that
section 14 is designed to give the Department of Health the authority to shut
down gay bathhouses.1 50 However, many experts believe that closing bath-
houses will not significantly reduce the transmission of the AIDS virus.151
142. Id. at 151 n.223 and accompanying text.
143. Id. at 78 n.65 and accompanying text.
144. H.B. 1151 & 1044, § 14.3.
145. Mo. REV. STAT. § 67.400 (1986) gives cities, towns, and villages and coun-
ties the power to institute vacation or demolition of buildings deemed to be detrimental
to citizens' health, safety or welfare. The local governments are required to codify what
conditions constitute a "nuisance" in an ordinance by Mo. REV. STAT. § 67.410 (1986).
146. Mo. REV. STAT. § 572.090 (1986).
147. Id. § 567.080.
148. Id. § 195.130.
149. Id. § 569.090.
150. Cf. Hillen, City Sees State Pressure to Close Gay Bathhouse, Kan. City
Times, April 9, 1988, at C-1, col. 1.
151. During telephone interviews with health officials in 22 different cities, 19
responded that, "closing bathhouses would not significantly reduce the transmission of
AIDS." Hillen, supra note 150, at C-1, col. 2, C-6, col. 1. Furthermore, Dr. Richard
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Aside from the fact that the state's aim of limiting HIV transmission may
not be furthered by closing bathhouses as nuisances, there are other reasons
why such an action could even hinder this goal. For example, because bath-
houses are locations where homosexual men meet, they are also places where
contact could be maintained with these individuals." 2 It is argued that safe
sex educational materials can be distributed or even mandated in the bath-
houses. This was the rationale of California Superior Court when it reopened
bathhouses closed by the health department. This action was allowed with the
proviso that patrons of the clubs be heavily monitored, that doors to individual
rooms be removed and preventative AIDS education be provided. 15 3
In the wake of cases like Bowers v. Hardwick'" and State v. Walsh'" it
is unlikely that a court would find any constitutional barrier in the way of
closing gay bathhouses for health reasons. Section 14, however, is drafted so
broadly that ordinary hotels, nightclubs and even hospitals might fall within
its definition of "nuisance." Although it is unlikely that the Department of
Health would attempt to enforce this provision to its fullest against "legiti-
mate" businesses, bars and clubs catering to gay clientele may not be so fortu-
nate. The Department need show only "illegal purpose involving sexual or
other contact through which transmission of HIV infection can occur." Could
kissing between same sex partners be considered to involve an "illegal pur-
pose" when part of an invitation to spend the night, in view of the fact that
Missouri prohibits sex between partners of the same gender? 5" Might not
some authorities be unwilling to say that transmission of HIV cannot occur via
kissing?5 7 Were the statute applied in this way it might well be unconstitu-
tional. 58 Yet the legal battle could be more costly than some businesses could
Biery, the Kansas City Health Director, claims that no sexually transmitted diseases
have been found to originate from bathhouse encounters in the last several years. Id.
Also, although incomplete when reported, one study purports to show that bathhouse
sex has no significant correlation to the spread of AIDS. Comment, Preventing the
Spreid of AIDS by Restricting Sexual Conduct in Gay Bathhouses: A Constitutional
Analysis, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 301, 313 (1985) (citing Bay Area Reporter,
Oct. 11, 1984, at 1, col. 1).
152. According to Marji Datwyler, AIDS program manager for the Kansas City
Department of Health, the Department contacts with the local gay bathhouse is one of
the Department's strongest links to the gay community. Closing it would disrupt this
contact. Hillen, supra note 150, at C-6, col. 1.
153. Comment, Preventing the Spread of AIDS by Restricting Sexual Conduct
in Gay Bathhouses: A Constitutional Analysis, 15 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 301, 308
n.41 (1985) (citing San Francisco v. Owen, No. 830-321 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 28,
1984)).
154. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (no constitutional privacy protection violated by stat-
ute prohibiting sodomy between consenting adults of the same sex).
155. 713 S.W.2d 508 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (Missouri statute which prohibits
same-sex consensual sexual activity does not violate federal constitutional guarantees of
equal protection and privacy).
156. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 566.090.1(3), .010.1(2).
157. Schultz, supra note 11, at 67 n.12.
158. Public health regulations must be reasonable and not overly broad. See gen-
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afford.
VII. CONCLUSION
AIDS is a deadly disease with the potential for far reaching affects on
everyone's life. It was appropriate and commendable for the Missouri legisla-
ture to deal with this problem and produce an emergency statute. However,
the statute includes many ambiguities and some unwise provisions which ought
to be remedied when the statute is replaced upon expiration of the current law
at the end of 1989. In the Appendix to this Article is a revision of the current
Missouri AIDS legislation which your authors believe meets many of the criti-
cisms we have levelled against the current statute.
erally Current topics in Law and Policy, 3 YALE POL. & L. REv. 479 (1984).
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Relating to public health and the human immunodeficiency virus that causes
acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, with penalty provisions and an emer-
gency clause.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF
MISSOURI AS FOLLOWS:
Section 1. As used in this act, the following terms mean:
1. "Disclose, to release, transfer, transmit, disseminate or otherwise com-
municate all or any part of any communication, note, record, or recorded data
in whatsoever form maintained either orally, in writing, or by electronic means
to any person or entity [;] as defined herein;
2. "HIV", the Human immunodeficiency virus that causes acquired im-
munodeficiency syndrome;
3. "HIV Infection", the pathological state of the human body in response
to HIV;
4. "HIV Blood sampling"; taking or ordering the taking of a sample of
venous blood from an individual which is subjected to serological tests for the
presence of HIV or its antibodies;
5. "HIV testing", performing a serological test or tests upon a sample of
venous blood [to] which will determine the presence of HIV or its antibodies
following HIV blood sampling;
6. "Person," private individuals and private and public bodies politic and
corporate, partnerships, joint ventures, trusts, and unincorporated associations
and [their] any officer[s], agent[s], or employee[s] or any of the foregoing.
7. "Health care professional" includes those professionals regulated by
chapters 330, 332, 334 and 335 RS Mo..
Section 2. 1. No person shall perform or conduct [HIV testing] any test
which has as a primary or ancillary purpose the detection of HIV or its an-
tibodies testing except physicians, hospitals, and those persons authorized by
the department of health. No person shall be authorized by the department of
health to perform or conduct HIV testing unless such person provides suitable
verification to the department that such testing shall be performed in accor-
dance with departmental regulations governing the types of tests performed
and the manner in which they are administered. The department [may] shall
monitor the continued compliance of such persons with department regula-
tions. Hospitals licensed pursuant to chapter 197, RSMo. shall be deemed to
be in compliance with departmental regulations governing HIV testing.
** This suggested bill is based on the current Missouri statute, H.B. 1151 &
1044, 84th General Assembly. Brackets [ indicate material to be deleted; underlining
indicates material to be added.
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2. No person shall perform an HIV-related test without first receiving the
written, informed consent of the subject of the test or the subject's legal
guardian. Any person who obtains the written informed consent shall certify
that informed consent has been received prior to ordering testing by a labora-
tory or other facility. This provision is subject to the exception of bona fide
medical emergencies where consent cannot be obtained for an HIV-related
test or any other medical procedure.
3. No person shall be deemed "HIV-positive" until that person has tested
positive under two distinct HIV tests, both of which have been approved by
the department of health. All HIV testing shall be performed in accordance
with the department rules governing HIV testing procedure.
[3.] 4. Except as provided in section 8 and 12 of this act, all physicians,
hospitals, or other persons authorized by the department of health who per-
form or conduct HIV blood sampling shall provide consultation with the sub-
ject prior to taking the sample and during the reporting of the test results and
shall report to the department of health the identity of any individual con-
firmed to be infected with HIV.
5. The term "consultation" as used in subsection (4) shall include, but not
be limited to:
(a) an explanation of the test, including its purposes, potential uses, limi-
tations and the meaning of its results;
(b) an explanation of the procedures to be followed including that the test
is voluntary; if such is the case, that consent may be withdrawn at any time,
and that the test can be obtained anonymously if the subject wishes. Any per-
son or entity that does not provide HIV-Related tests on an anonymous basis
shall refer any person desiring an anonymous test to a test site which does
provide anonymous testing;
(c) an explanation of the nature of AIDS and ARC and the relationship
between the test result and those conditions;
(d) counseling for coping with the emotional consequences of learning the
test result or make referrals for counseling for coping with the emotional con-
sequences of learning the test results;
(e) information about behaviors or activities known to pose risks for the
transmission of HIV infection;
(f) an explanation of the importance of informing persons who may have
become infected with HIV through contact with the subject, should the sub-
ject have been tested positive, including information that the department of
health is available to contact those persons should the subject prefer not to.
Section 3.[1. (1) All information and records containing any information
held or maintained by any person, agency, department, or political subdivision
of the state concerning an individual's HIV infection status or the results of
any individual's HIV testing shall be strictly confidential and shall not be dis-
closed except to:
(a) Public employees within the agency, department, or political subdivi-
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sion who need to know to perform their public duties;
(b) Public employees of other agencies, departments, or political subdivi-
sions who need to know to perform their public duties;
(c) Persons other than public employees who are entrusted with the regu-
lar care of those under the care and custody of a state agency, including but
not limited to operators of day care facilities, group homes, residential care
facilities and adoptive or foster parents;
(d) As authorized by subsection 2 of this section:
(2) Further disclosure by public employees shall be governed by subsec-
tion 2 and 3 of this section. Public employees violating such requirements may
be subject to civil actions brought under subsection 4 of this section.
2. (1) Unless the person acted in bad faith or with conscious disregard, no
person shall be liable for violating any duty or right of confidentiality estab-
lished by law for disclosing the results of an individual's HIV testing;
(a) To the Department of health;
(b) To health care personnel working directly with the infected individual
who have a reasonable need to know the results for the purpose of providing
direct patient health care;
(c) Pursuant to the written authorization of the subject of the test result
or results;
(d) To the spouse of the subject of the test result or results;
(e) To the subject of the test result of results;
(f) To the parent or legal guardian or custodian of the subject of the
testing, if he is an unemancipated minor.
(2) Paragraphs (b) and (d) of subdivision (1) of this subsection shall not
be construed in any court to impose any duty on a person to disclose the re-
sults of an individuals's HIV testing to a spouse or health care professional or
other potentially exposed person, parent or guardian.
(3) No person to whom the results of an individual's HIV testing has
been disclosed pursuant to paragraph (b) and (c) of subdivision (1) of this
subsection shall further disclose such results.
(4) When the results of HIV testing, disclosed pursuant to paragraph (b)
of subdivision (1) of this subsection, are included in the medical record of the
patient who is subject to the test, the inclusion is not a disclosure for purposes
of such paragraph so long as such medical record is afforded the same confi-
dentiality protection afforded other medical records.
(3) All communications between the subject of HIV testing and a physi-
cian, hospital, or other person authorized by the department of health who
performs or conducts HIV blood sampling shall be privileged communications.
(4) The identity of any individual participating in a research project ap-
proved by an institutional review board shall not be reported to the depart-
ment of health by the physician conducting the research project.
(5) The subject of HIV testing who is fund to have HIV infection shall
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disclose such information to any health care professional from whom such
person receives health care services. Said notification shall be made prior to
receiving services from such health care professional.
(6) Any individual who is injured as a result of a violation of this section
may bring a civil action for damages. If it is found in a civil action that:
(1) A person has negligently violated this section, the person is liable for:
(a) Actual damages; and
(b) Court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the person
bringing the action; or
(2) Any person who demonstrates a conscious disregard or has willfully
violated this section, is liable for:
(a) Actual damages;
(b) Exemplary damages; and
(c) Court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the person
bringing the action.
7. No civil liability shall accrue to any health care provider as a result of
making a good faith report to the department of health about a person reason-
ably believed to be infected with HIV, or cooperating in good faith with the
department in an investigation determining whether a court order directing an
individual to undergo HIV testing will be sought, or in participating in good
faith in any judicial proceeding resulting from such a report or investigations
and any person making such a report, or cooperating with such an investiga-
tion or participating in such judicial proceeding shall be immune from civil
liability as a result of such actions so long as taken in good faith.
8. (1) As used in this subsection, the following terms mean:
(a) "Emergency medical person," any person trained and authorized by
law or rule to render emergency medical assistance or treatment such as but
not exclusively limited to emergency first responders, ambulance attendants,
and attendant-drivers, emergency medical technicians, mobile emergency med-
ical technicians, emergency medical technician-paramedics, registered nurses,
or physicians;
(b) "Licensed facility", a facility licensed under chapter 197 RSMo, or a
nursing home licensed under chapter 198, RSMo.
(2) A licensed facility that receives a patient who is subsequently diag-
nosed as having a reportable infectious or contagious disease as defined by the
department of health shall notify:
(a) The employer of any firefighter, police officer, or emergency medical
person that such firefighter, police officer, or emergency medical person has
been exposed to such patient during emergency rescue operations, medical
treatment, or transportation of such facility; or
(b) Mortuary personnel involved in the removal of such deceased patient
from such facility or the care of such deceased patient thereafter.
The notification shall be made as soon as possible after the HIV infectious or
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contagious disease has been confirmed as such. The employer shall request
such person to contact the licensed facility to receive the appropriate medical
direction. Notification shall be conducted in a manner that protects the confi-
dentiality of the patient and the firefighter, police officer, or emergency medi-
cal technician.] No person shall disclose or be compelled to disclose the iden-
tity of any person upon whom an HIV-Related test has been performed, or the
results of such a test in any manner which permits identification of the subject
of the test, except to the following persons:
(1) The subject of the test or the subject's legal guardian.
(2) Any person who secures a legally effective release of the test results
executed by the subject of the test or the subject's legal guardian.
(3) An authorized agent or employee of a health facility or health care
provider if the health facility or heath care provider itself is authorized to
obtain the test results, any agent or employee who provides patient care or
handles or processes specimens of body fluids or tissues, and the agent or em-
ployee has a medical need to know such information.
(4) Licensed medical personnel providing care to the subject of the test,
when knowledge of the test results is necessary to provide appropriate emer-
gency care or treatment.
(5) The Missouri department of health or the Centers for Disease Control
of the United States Public Health Service in accordance with reporting re-
quirements for a diagnosed case of AIDS, or a related condition.
(6) A health facility or health care provider which procures, distributes or
uses:
(i) A human body part from a deceased person; or
(ii) semen provided prior to the effective date of this Act for the purpose
of artificial insemination.
(7) Health facility staff committees or accreditation on oversight review
organizations which are conducting program monitoring, program evaluation
or service reviews.
(8) A person allowed access a test record by a court order, No order of
any court shall issue permitting access to any of the records referred to in this
subsection unless it is issued in compliance with the following provisions:
(i) No court of this State shall issue an order permitting access to test
results unless the court finds that the person seeking the disclosure of the test
results has demonstrated a compelling need for the disclosure of the test re-
sults which cannot be accommodated by other means. In assessing compelling
need, the court shall weigh the need for disclosure against the privacy interest
of the test subject and the public interest which may be diserved by disclosure
which deters testing or which may lead to discrimination.
(ii) Pleadings pertaining to disclosure of test results shall substitute a
pseudonym for the true name of the subject of the test. The disclosure to the
parties of the subject's true name shall be communicated confidentially, in no
court of this state shall issue an order permitting access to test results unless
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documents not filed with the court.
(iii) Before granting any such order, the court shall provide the individual
whose test result is in question with notice and a reasonable opportunity to
participate in a hearing upon the issue if he or she is not already a party.
(iv) Any Court proceedings regarding the disclosure of HIV test results
shall be conducted in camera unless the subject of the test agrees to a hearing
in open court or unless the court makes a specific determination that a public
hearing is necessary to protect the public safety and the proper administration
of justice.
(v) Upon the issuance of an order requiring the disclosure of test results,
the court shall impose appropriate safeguards against an authorized disclosure,
which shall specify the persons who may have access to the information, how
the information shall be used, and appropriate prohibitions on
(vi) No person to whom the results of an HIV-related test have been dis-
closed pursuant to Section 3 of this Act may disclose the test results to an-
other person except as authorized by Section 3.
(vii) Whenever test results are disclosed pursuant to this Act it shall be
accompanied by a statement in writing which includes the following or sub-
stantially similar language; "This information has been disclosed to you from
records whose confidentiality is protected by State law. State law prohibits you
from making any further disclosure of it without the specific written consent of
the person to whom it pertains, or as otherwise permitted by law. A general
authorization for the release of medical or other information is NOT sufficient
for this purpose." An oral disclosure shall be accompanied by such a notice
within 10 days of any oral disclosures.
2. Any person aggrieved by a violation of this Act shall have a civil cause
of action. Any such action may be brought in the Circuit Court of the County
of the aggrieved person or in the County where the cause of action arose. Any
aggrieved person may recover for each violation:
(1) Against any person who negligently violates a provision of this Act,
liquidated damages of $1000 or actual damages, whichever is greater.
(2) Against any person who intentionally or recklessly violates a provision
of this Act, liquidated damages of $5000 or actual damages, whichever is
greater.
(3) Reasonable attorney fees, including costs of the action.
(4) Such other relief, including an injunction or other equitable relief, as
the court may deem appropriate.
3. Any action under this Act is barred unless the action is commenced
within three years after the cause of action accrues.
4. Nothing in this Act is intended to nor shall it be construed to limit the
rights of the subject of an HIV-related test to recover damages or obtain other
relief under any other applicable law or at common law.
5. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to impose civil liability or crimi-
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nal sanctions for disclosure of an HIV-related test result in accordance with
any reporting requirement for a diagnosed case of AIDS or a related condition
by the department of health or the Centers for Disease Control of the United
States Public Health Service.
6. Nothing in this Act shall be construed to impose civil liability or crimi-
nal sanctions for failure to disclose the results of any individual's HIV testing
to a spouse or health professional or other potentially exposed person, parent
or guardian, or other person or entity.
7. All communications regarding health matters between the subject of
HIV testing and any health care provider, hospital, or other person authorized
by the department of health to perform or conduct of who requires HIV blood
sampling shall be confidential and privileged communications.
8. The identity of any individual participating in any research project ap-
proved by an institutional review board shall not be reported to the depart-
ment of health by the health care provider conducting the research project or
by any other person.
9. Any person who has the HIV infection shall disclose such condition to
any health care professional from whom the person receives health care ser-
vices. For the purposes of this section, a "health care professional" shall mean
any person licensed or regulated by the provisions of chapters 330, 332, 334
and 335, including a student whose professional responsibilities involve contact
with a person's blood or other bodily fluids in a health care setting. The notifi-
cation provided for in this Section shall be made prior to receiving professional
services from the health care professional. After disclosure by the patient, no
health care professional may refuse to treat the patient because of the disclo-
sure of HIV infection.
10. Any health care professional, as that term is defined in this Act, who,
after disclosure has been made by a patient of HIV infection, refused to treat
the patient for any reason related to the patients health care needs, shall be
held to have committed an act of unprofessional conduct and an act violative
of the professional trust and confidence required of health care professionals as
these terms are used in Sections 330.160, 332.321, 334.100 and 335.066
RSMo.
Section 4. 1. All [individuals] persons who are [delivered] committed to
the department of corrections and human resources and are confined in a cor-
rectional institution of the state and all individuals who are released or dis-
charged from any institution operated by the department of corrections and
human resources[,] and before such individuals are released or discharged,
shall undergo HIV testing without the right of refusal[.] if the crime for which
the individual was convicted posed some risk of infection to another person. In
addition, the department of corrections and human resources may perform or
conduct HIV testing on all individuals required to undergo annual or biannual
physical examination by the department of examinations[.] if the department
has reasonable cause to believe an individual is infected with HIV. The De-
partment of corrections and human services shall provide HIV testing to any
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person in its care and custody who requests such testing.
2. The provisions of this Act regarding dissemination of test results, in-
formed consent, and confidentiality shall apply to any tests performed by the
department of corrections and human services.
Section 5. 1. The department of mental health may perform or conduct
HIV testing or HIV sampling without the right of refusal [on:] after obtaining
an order from the proper probate court, and pursuant to Section 3 of this Act
in any of the following circumstances:
(1) Any individual participating in a methadone treatment program for
the treatment of intravenous drug abuse [and who] when the person has re-
fused to undergo such testing [whenever] provided there are reasonable
grounds other than the individual's intravenous drug use to believe that the
individual is infected with HIV and [is a reasonable health threat to others]
the individual poses an unreasonable danger to the health of himself for
others:
(2) Any individual under the care and custody of the department of
mental health who has refused to undergo testing whenever there are reasona-
ble grounds other than the individual's mental incapacities to believe that the
individual is infected with HIV and [is a reasonable] the individual poses an
unreasonable danger to the health [threat] to himself or to others, unless such
testing is otherwise prohibited by law.
2. The department of mental health shall not report to the department of
health the identity of any individual for whom HIV testing pursuant to this
section confirms HIV infection if such reporting is prohibited by federal law or
regulation.
Section 6. 1. [Provisions of chapter 213, RSMo., shall apply to individuals
with HIV infection, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome and acquired immu-
nodeficiency syndrome related complex; provided that such protection shall not
include an individual who has a currently contagious disease or infection and
who, by reason of such disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to
the health or safety of other individuals or who, by reason of the currently
contagious disease or infection, is unable to perform the duties of their em-
ployment.] Unless a demonstrated bona fide health risk or occupational quali-
fication exists, it shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person to
discriminate against any individual, solely on the grounds that such individual
has HIV infection, in the following areas:
(1) To deny such individual the full and equal enjoyment of, or to impose
different terms and conditions on the availability of, any facility, service, assis-
tance, or benefits of any city, county or state agency or political subdivision
thereof; or any governmental, political or quasipolitical entity in this state.
(2) For an employer, as that term is defined in subdivision (5) of section
213.010, RSMo., to fail or refuse to hire, or to discharge, or to fail to promote
or who demotes an individual, or to discriminate against any individual with
respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, unless
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the individual's HIV infection renders the person medically unable to perform
the duties of the employment position or a clear public health danger would
result from the individual's employment.
3. To interrupt, terminate, or fail or refuse to initiate or conduct any
transaction involving real property with an individual, including but not lim-
ited to the rental thereof, or to require different terms or conditions for any
transaction;
4. To deny any individual the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, ser-
vices, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of any business or
establishment or accommodation open to the public.
5. To deny admission to, or impose different terms or conditions on admis-
sion, any individual to a public educational institution or any education insti-
tution receiving public funds.
2. Subsection 1 of this section shall not mean, nor be construed to mean that
any action taken by the Missouri commission on human rights prior to the
effective date of this act concerning discrimination against any individual on
the basis that such individual has HIV infection or is perceived to have HIV
infection to be an improper exercise of authority by the commission.
3. No third person shall be liable for the transmission of HIV from one
person to another solely on the basis that the third person knew that the per-
son who transmitted the HIV infection was infected with HIV.
Section 7.[1] The department of health shall prepare public education
and awareness plans and programs for the general public, and the department
of elementary and secondary education shall prepare educational programs for
public schools, regarding means of transmission and prevention and treatment
of the HIV virus. The plans and programs shall include, but not be limited to:
(1) Medically correct, age specific, transmission and prevention programs
for use at the discretion of the public schools beginning with students at the
sixth grade level. The educational programs shall stress moral responsibility in
and restraint from sexual activity and avoidance of controlled substance use
whereby HIV can be transmitted:
(2) Risk reduction programs for specific populations at high risk of HIV
infection:
(3) Educational programs on transmission and prevention of HIV infec-
tion in the work place for use by employers;
(4) Personal protection procedures for use by health care providers and
others [in close] whose contact with potentially infected individuals[;] may
pose a demonstrable risk of infection;
(5) General public information programs and circulars containing factual
information that will allow the public at large to assess its risk and develop
informed individual judgments and behavior habits. The department shall pre-
pare for free distribution among the residents of the state printed information
concerning the means of transmission of the HIV virus, the dangers from HIV
infection, means of prevention, and the benefits and limitations of tests for
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HIV antibodies, and the availibility of testing, including the existence and
location of anonymous testing sites; and
(6) Develop presentations for community service and school organizations
describing the medical and psychosocial aspects of HIV infection, including
information on how infection is transmitted and how its transmission can be
prevented.
(7) General information programs and circulars and programs tailored to
specific groups designed to describe and inform all citizens of the provisions in
this act and promote the public awareness of these provisions.
[2. None of the plans, programs or printed information prepared or pro-
vided under this section shall promote behavior that is offense in violation of
chapter 5566, RSMo., concerning sexual offenses; is an offense involving the
use of a controlled substance as defined in chapter 195, RSMo.; is an offense
in violation of section 568.020, RSMo., concerning incest; or is an offense in
violation of any city, county or state law prohibiting prostitution of patronizing
prostitution.]
Section 8. 1. No other section of this Act but sections 2, 3 and 6 shall
apply to any insurer, health services corporation, or health maintenance organ-
ization licensed by the division of insurance which conducts HIV testing or
which requires HIV testing only for the purpose of assessing a person's fitness
for insurance coverage offered by such insurer, health services corporation, or
health maintenance corporation, except that nothing in this section shall be
construed to exempt any insurer, health services corporation or health mainte-
nance organization in their capacity as employers from the provisions of sec-
tion 6 of this act relating to employment practices.
2. Upon renewal of any individual or group insurance policy, subscriber
contractor health maintenance organization contract covering medical ex-
penses, no insurer, health services corporation or health maintenance organiza-
tion shall deny or alter coverage to any previously covered individual who has
been diagnosed as having HIV infection or any HIV related condition [during
the previous policy or contract period only] solely because of such diagnosis,
nor shall any such insurer, health services corporation or health maintenance
organization exclude or limit coverage for treatment of such infection or con-
dition with respect to any such individual.
3. The director of the division of insurance shall establish by regulations
not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, standards for the use of HIV
testing by insurers, health services corporations and health maintenance
organizations.
4. A laboratory certified by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act of 1967, permitting
testing of specimens obtained in interstate commerce, and which subjects itself
to ongoing proficiency testing by the College of American Pathologists, the
American Association of Bio Analysts, or an equivalent program approved by
the Centers for Disease Control shall be authorized to perform or conduct
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HIV testing for an insurer, health services corporation or health maintenance
organization pursuant to this [section] Act.
5. The result or results of HIV testing of an applicant for insurance cover-
age shall not be disclosed by an insurer, health services corporation or health
maintenance organization, except as specifically authorized by such applicant
in writing. Such result or results shall however been disclosed to a physician
designated by the subject of the test. If there is no physician designated, the
insurer, health services corporation, or health maintenance organization shall
disclose the identity of individuals residing in Missouri having a confirmed
positive HIV test result to the department of health. Provided, further, that no
such insurer, health services corporation or health maintenance organization
shall be liable for violating any duty or right of confidentiality established by
law for disclosing such identity of individuals having a conformed positive
HIV test result to the department of health. [Such] Disclosure to the depart-
ment of health shall be in the manner that ensures the confidentiality of the
applicant. Disclosure of test results in violation of this section shall constitute
a violation of sections 375.390 to 375.948, RSMo., regulating trade practices
in the business of insurance. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to
foreclose any remedies existing under any statute or at common law on the
effective date of this act.
Section 9. 1. The department of health may seek in its own name in a court of
competent jurisdiction a court order directing an individual to undergo HIV
testing without the right of refusal after reasonable efforts have been made by
the department to obtain the informed consent of the individual to HIV test-
ing. The court shall grant such order whenever there are reasonable grounds to
believe that an individual is infected with HIV which belief is substantiated by
medical documentation and there is clear and convincing evidence of a serious
and present health threat to others posed by the individual if it is determined
that the individual is infected.
2. If the department commences any proceeding authorized by this sec-
tion, any individual who is the subject of the action shall have a right to an
adversarial proceeding, together with the right to counsel. If the individual
cannot afford counsel, one shall be provided. To the extent practicable the
provisions of section 3(8) of this act shall apply to any proceeding brought
pursuant to this section. [2.] 3. The record of any suit filed pursuant to this
section shall be closed to the public and, at the request of the individual, any
hearing shall be held in camera.
Section 10. 1. It shall be unlawful for any individual knowingly infected
with HIV to:
(1) Be or attempt to be a blood, organ, sperm or tissue donor except as
deemed necessary for medical research; or
(2) Deliberately [create a grave and unjustifiable risk of infection] infect
or attempt to infect another with HIV through sexual or other contact [when
an individual knows that he is creating that risk.] involving a substantial risk
of infusing bodily fluid of an infected person into the bloodstream of another.
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However, this provision shall not be construed to include circumstances where
the risk has been disclosed by the infected person to the other person prior to
the exposing act.
2. To establish a violation of this provision, it must be shown that the
individual was tested for HIV and informed of the positive result prior to the
commission of the exposing act.
[2.] 3. Violation of the provisions of subsection 1 of this section is a class
D felony.
[3.] 4. The department of health shall have sole responsibility for the en-
forcement of subsection 1 of this section. The department of health may file a
complaint with the prosecuting attorney of any county, or with the attorney
general requesting that such official file an action in a court of competent ju-
risdiction alleging that an individual has violated a provision of subsection 1 of
this section. The department of health shall assist the prosecut[or] ing attor-
ney or the attorney general as the case may be, in preparing [such] the prose-
cution of the case.
Section 11. The department of health shall regularly report to the appro-
priate committees of both houses of the general assembly:
[(1) The number of individuals with HIV infection for whom a health
care plan has been developed detailing the form and impact of such health
care plans in a manner that does not identify or provide identifying character-
istics of an individual infected with HIV:]
[(2)] (1) The nature and extent to which the department has utilized
judicial proceedings provided for by this act in a manner that does not identify
or provide identifying characteristics of any individual subject to such
proceedings;
[(3)] (2) The form and extent of the handling of federal funds available
to the department of health for disbursement for implementing this act;
[(4)] (3.) The form and extent of programs and efforts funded by state
funds for implementing this act; and
[(5)] (4.) Any other information such committees shall seek[.] the disclo-
sure of which does not violate any provision of this act.
Section 12. [The department of health may promulgate rules providing
for mandatory premarital HIV testing if the Centers for Disease Control so
indicates.]
1. Any person seeking an HIV-related test who wishes to remain anony-
mous shall have the right to do so, and have the right to provide written,
informed consent through use of a coded system with no linking of individual
identity to the test request or results.
[Section 13. 1] 2. The department of health shall designate one HIV test-
ing site in the St. Louis area, one in the Kansas City area, and one in the
Springfield area where those persons not required to undergo HIV testing
without the right of refusal may be tested anonymously. The department of
health shall designate such other numbers of test sites so as to make anony-
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mous testing readily available and reasonably accessible to all residents of this
state.
[2.] 3. All physicians, hospitals, or other persons authorized by the de-
partment of health who perform or conduct HIV blood sampling may refuse to
perform or conduct anonymous HIV blood sampling for an individual and may
refer such person to the designated HIV testing sites.
[3.] 4. A coded system that does not link individual identity with the
request or result shall be used to report the results of such testing to the de-
partment of health.
[4.] 5. All designated HIV testing sites shall be required to initiate con-
tact notification when submitting test results to individuals who request anony-
mous testing and who test positive for HIV infection.
[Section 14. 1 1. Any person who shall erect, establish, continue, main-
tain, use, own, or lease any building, structure, or place used for the purpose
of lewdness, assignation, or illegal purpose involving sexual or other contact
through which transmission of HIV infection can occur is guilty of maintain-
ing a nuisance.
2. The building, structure, or place, or the ground itself, in or upon which
any such lewdness, assignation, or illegal purpose is conducted, permitted, car-
ried on, continued, or exists, and the furniture, fixtures, musical instruments,
and movable property used in conducting or maintaining such nuisance, are
hereby declared to be a nuisance and shall be enjoined and abated as provided
in subsection 3 of this section.
3. If the existence of a nuisance is admitted or established in an action
pursuant to this section or in a criminal proceeding in any court, an order of
abatement shall be entered as part of the judgement in the case. The order
shall direct the effectual closing of the business for any purpose, and so keep-
ing it closed for a period of one year.
4. The department of health shall file suit in its own name in any court of
competent jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of this section.]
Section [15.] 13. 1. Only after [a] elementary or secondary school has
adopted a formal policy consistent with the recommendations for the Centers
of Disease Control on school children who test positive for HIV shall the de-
partment of health give prompt and confidential notice of the identity of any
child reported to the department to have HIV infection and the parent or
guardian of any child confirmed by the department of health standards to have
HIV infection shall also give prompt and confidential notice of the identity of
such child to the superintendent of the school district in which the child [re-
sides] attends school, and if the child attends a nonpublic elementary or sec-
ondary, to the chief administrative officer of such school.
2. The superintendent or chief administrative officer of any elementary or
secondary school may disclose the identity of an infected child to those person:
(a) who are designated by the school district to determine the fitness of an
individual to attend school; and
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(b) who have a reasonable need to know the identity of the child in order
to provide proper health care at the school.
[Section 16. This act shall expire on December 31, 1989.]
Section [17.] 14. 1. No rule or portion of a rule promulgated under the
authority of this act shall become effective under a public hearing has been
held as provided by chapter 536 RSMo., and it has been approved by the joint
committee on administrative rules. Upon filing any proposed rule with the sec-
retary of state, the department of health shall concurrently submit such pro-
posed rule to the committee which may hold hearings upon any proposed rule
and may disapprove any proposed rule or portion thereof at any time. In the
event the committee disapproves any proposed rule or portion thereof, the
committee shall notify the department of health and the secretary of state. If
any proposed rule or portion thereof is disapproved by the committee, the sec-
retary of state shall publish in the Missouri register, as soon as practicable, an
order that such rule or portion thereof has been disapproved.
2. The department of health shall not file any final order of rule making
with the secretary of state until twenty days after such final order of rule
making has been received by the committee. The committee may hold one or
more hearings upon such final order of rule making during the twenty day
period. If the committee neither approves or disapproves any order of rule
making within the twenty day period, the department of health may file such
order of rule making with the secretary of state and the order of rule making
shall be deemed approved, subject to subsequent suspension by the committee.
In the event the committee disapproves any order of rule making or portion
thereof, the committee shall notify the department of health and the secretary
of state. If any final order of rule making or portion thereof is disapproved by
the committee, the department of health shall not file any disapproved provi-
sion in an order of rule making and the secretary of state shall not publish any
disapproved provision in the Missouri register.
3. Any rule or portion of a rule promulgated under this authority of this
act may be suspended by the committee at any time after a hearing has been
conducted thereon. If any rule or portion of a rule is suspended by the com-
mittee, the secretary of state shall publish in the Missouri register, as soon as
practicable, an order withdrawing the rule or portion of a rule.
4. [No other provision of chapter 536, RSMo., regarding notice, publica-
tion or nonjudicial review of any rule promulgated by the department of
health shall be applicable to such rules.] The provisions of chapter 536 RSMo.
to the contrary notwithstanding any person seeking judicial review of any such
rule promulgated pursuant to this act shall be deemed to have exhausted all
administrative review procedures. Notwithstanding the provisions of section
1.140 RSMo., the provisions of this section are nonseverable and the grant of
rule making authority of this act is essentially dependent on the review power
vested with the committee. If the reviewer power is held unconstitutional or
invalid, the grant of rule making authority and any rule promulgated under
such rule making authority shall also be invalid or void.
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Section A. Because immediate action is necessary in order to contain the
spread of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome, this act is deemed necessary
for the immediate preservation of the public health, welfare, peace and safety,
and is hereby declared to be an emergency act within the meaning of the
constitution, and this act shall be in full force and effect upon its passage and
approval.
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